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(Under the Direction of James Woods) 
ABSTRACT 
The object of this thesis is to examine the role of Joel R. Poinsett’s role in the 
Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833 in South Carolina within the context of his previous 
experiences abroad.  The work will analyze Poinsett’s occupations before his role as 
leader of the Unionists in South Carolina to better understand his actions during the 
crisis.  The work will also examine how his experience in the Nullification Crisis affected 
his time as secretary of war under Martin Van Buren. 
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Joel Roberts Poinsett is the most fascinating, yet forgotten figure of the Early 
Republic era.  Many know that he is responsible for discovering the flower which bears 
his name, but this is the least of his accomplishments.  As leader of the Unionists in 
South Carolina, his letters to President Andrew Jackson during the Nullification Crisis 
proved invaluable to the latter in formulating a strategy to end the crisis peacefully.  
Furthermore, as secretary of war, he was directly responsible for the advancement of 
John C. Fremont’s career, overseeing the Trial of Tears, and co-founding of the National 
Institute of Science, later renamed the Smithsonian Institution.   
Noting these accomplishments, it seems strange that Poinsett’s life has not 
received further review than it has.  Poinsett was not as prominent as Andrew Jackson, 
Henry Clay, or his rival in the Nullification Crisis, John C. Calhoun.  Poinsett lacked the 
oratorical skills of these Americans, and perhaps the political skills of them as well.  
While the contemporary American public was familiar with these names due to the nature 
of their careers, Poinsett’s role in American affairs was less pronounced, but no less 
important.  As a young man he desired military fame and notoriety, and his career as 
diplomat in South America and Mexico illustrate this.  Yet, as leader of the Unionists in 
South Carolina, Poinsett finally found his niche as an informer and organizer in a 
somewhat military sense.  He also received the chance to apply his military knowledge.  
This experience solidified Poinsett’s nationalism and gave him the connections and 
experience needed for a successful career as secretary of war.   
For a man who had such a varied and interesting career, Poinsett has attracted few 
biographies.  Charles J. Stille’s The Life and Services of Joel R. Poinsett, the Confidential 
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Agent in South Carolina of President Jackson during the Nullification Troubles of 1832 
is the earliest narrative of Poinsett.  Stille’s work first appeared in the Philadelphia 
Magazine of History and Biography in 1888.  The work relies exclusively on the mass of 
Poinsett’s personal correspondence which was donated to the Philadelphia Historical 
Society at the time.  While Stille’s stated interest is to shed light on Poinsett’s career, he 
ends his study with the Nullification Crisis.   
In the early twentieth century, Poinsett’s career in Latin American affairs received 
the most attention.  His role as first American minister to Mexico received an in depth 
treatment by William Ray Manning’s Poinsett’s Mission to Mexico, and is later 
expounded upon in Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, 
published in 1916.  Manning details Poinsett’s maneuverings against British minister 
Henry George Ward, as well as how his association with the Freemasonry society 
affected his role as diplomat.  Poinsett’s entire diplomatic career received a careful study 
in 1934 in Dorothy M. Parton’s dissertation, “The Diplomatic Career of Joel Poinsett.”  
Parton’s work reviews Poinsett’s deeds in South America, his 1822 trip to Mexico, and 
his later role as minister.   
Poinsett’s whole career did receive a fuller treatment in 1935.  In that year, two 
works were published, Herbert E. Putnam’s Joel R. Poinsett:  A Political Biography, and 
J. Fred Rippy’s Joel R. Poinsett:  Versatile American.  Putnam’s was the first.  It relies on 
the twenty-three volumes of Poinsett Papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, but 
is supplemented contemporary newspapers and secondary sources.  Rippy’s interest in 
Poinsett stems from his earlier work, Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over 
Latin America, in which Poinsett is discussed.  These books are quite similar, both 
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detailing Poinsett’s life from birth to death.  In his preface, Rippy states that he is 
indebted to Dr. Herbert Putnam for allowing him to examine his manuscript, “as well as 
for not a few ideas and, in some instances perhaps, for almost his very phrasing, which 
unwittingly I may have reproduced.” 
Poinsett’s career did not receive a new study until 1972.  George Anthony 
Hruneni Jr.’s “Palmetto Yankee:  The Public Life and Times of Joel Roberts Poinsett:  
1824-1851” begins with Poinsett’s career in Mexico and ends with his death in 1851.  
While Hruneni’s work seeks to illustrate the importance of Poinsett’s roles as minister to 
Mexico, Jacksonian Unionist, secretary of war, and lastly southern Unionist, he does not 
hesitate to write critically of Poinsett’s life. 
Poinsett’s role as Unionist in the Nullification crisis is mentioned in some way in 
most books on the crisis.  In Prelude to Civil War, William Freehling gives Poinsett a 
prominent role in the latter half of 1832, while before that Freehling sees him as having 
less of a role.  Richard Ellis’s Union at Risk, which analyzes the constitutional issues of 
nullification, briefly recognizes Poinsett’s role in the crisis.  Furthermore, most works 
focusing on Andrew Jackson mention Poinsett in the chapter detailing Jackson’s handling 
of the nullification crisis.  The Life of Andrew Jackson, by Robert V. Remini, is one such 
work.   
There are a few other works in which Poinsett is not the focus of the narrative, but 
nevertheless figures prominently.  Tom Chaffin explains why and how Poinsett impacted 
the life of John C. Fremont in his biography Pathfinder:  John C. Fremont and the 
Course of American Empire.  Moreover, in So Far From God:  The U.S. War with 
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Mexico, 1846-1848,  John S.D. Eisenhower recognizes Poinsett’s role in developing light 
artillery units, many of which were highly distinguished in the Mexican-American war.   
The most severe problems with the current works on Poinsett are their age, and 
scope.  Rippy and Putnam’s works are the only two that treat Poinsett’s life fully.  
Unfortunately those books are mirror images of one another, and they leave important 
gaps, such as Poinsett’s thoughts on slavery.  None of them adequately treat his role as a 
Unionist as it should be.  Most give more attention to his time in Latin America or as 
secretary of war.  Poinsett’s life abroad instilled in him a love of order, and thus the 
Union, leading him to the highlight of his career as the leader of the Unionist party during 
the Nullification crisis, and to be a successful secretary of war.  The focus of this 
Master’s Thesis is to examine his role as leader of the Unionists in South Carolina during 
the Nullification Crisis.  Joel R. Poinsett deserves a modern biography illustrating both 
his adventurous life and his contributions to public service.   
 12
CHAPTER 1  
RESTLESS TRAVELER 
        Joel Roberts Poinsett was born on March 2, 1779 in Charleston, South Carolina.  
Only two years before, American colonists repelled a British invasion of the city.  As an 
infant, Poinsett was present in 1780 when the British regained control of the city.  The 
son of Dr. Elisha Poinsett and Ann Roberts Poinsett, his family was of Huguenot descent, 
thus his ancestors most likely migrated to America in search of religious freedom.1   
 Elisha was not present at his son’s birth because he was in Savannah tending the 
wounds of American soldiers.  While he supported the Revolution, his loyalties changed 
during the years after the British occupation of Charleston.  He and other prominent 
Charlestonians, Colonel Charles Pinckney and Daniel Huger being the most notable, 
renewed their allegiance to the British Crown to protect their estates from confiscation.  
Because of this change in attitude, it was not safe for them to remain in Charleston.  In 
1782, Dr. Poinsett fled with his family to England, where they remained for six years.  
Poinsett’s mother, Ann, was English, which may have contributed to the family’s 
decision.  Because of the circumstances regarding his family’s departure, Dr. Poinsett 
was not branded a Tory for his actions, and the family returned to Charleston in 1791.   
Dr. Poinsett began his son’s formal education in England, yet upon the family’s 
return to Charleston, Joel received classical training from Reverend James H. Thompson.  
In 1794, at the age of fifteen, young Poinsett attended the academy of Doctor Timothy 
Dwight at Greenfield, Connecticut.  Soon thereafter, Poinsett left this school due to ill 
health.  Physically weak and predisposed to tuberculosis, young Poinsett was sent to 
                                                 
1 Charles J. Stille, The Life and Services of Joel R. Poinsett, The Confidential Agent in South Carolina of 
President Jackson During The Nullification Troubles of 1832, (Philadelphia:  The Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography, 1888), 6-7. 
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Wandsworth, England, to attend a private school were his mother’s relative was 
headmaster.  He was a good student and became proficient in several languages, 
including Spanish, French, Italian, and German. 
 Poinsett first wanted to be a doctor like his father; after a year at Wandsworth, he 
entered Edinburgh College to study medicine.  In October of 1797, he was enrolled in 
chemistry, pharmacy, surgery, and anatomy.  Once again his health began to fail, so he 
left the school in 1798, embarking on a journey to Lisbon, Portugal, to regain his health.  
The vessel he traveled on was required to sail in a merchant convoy as England was now 
at war with Napoleon Bonaparte of France.2   
Perhaps as a consequence of his proximity to this martial conflict, Poinsett 
decided to abandon his quest to be a physician to study military affairs.  Upon his return 
to England, he attempted to enroll in the Royal Military Academy in Woolwhich.  He 
was denied enrollment, but studied directly under M. Marbois, a retired professor at the 
academy.  Poinsett received tutoring in many different areas including the operations of 
cavalry, marching, and counter-marching.3  
 Upon returning to Charleston in 1800, Poinsett became convinced he desired a 
military career.  Dr. Poinsett did not welcome the news as he did not want his son to be a 
soldier.  Hoping to entice his son to settle into the Charleston aristocracy, Dr. Poinsett 
persuaded Joel to study law.  As a student of H.W. DeSaussure, a prominent lawyer of 
Charleston, it soon became clear that young Joel had little interest in becoming a lawyer.  
A restless Poinsett convinced his parents to allow him to go on an extended tour of 
Europe in 1801.  DeSaussure sent with him a list of law books including Blackstone’s 
                                                 




Commentaries and Burn’s Ecclesiastical Law, just in case young Poinsett changed his 
mind regarding the practice of law.4   
 In the winter of 1801, young Poinsett’s travels in Europe began.   During this 
time, he stayed in Paris and observed Napoleon’s domestic reforms.  In the spring of 
1802, Poinsett set out for Italy traveling through the Alps and Switzerland.  From there he 
visited the cities of Naples and hiked up Mount Etna on the island of Sicily.  Poinsett 
finally returned to Switzerland in the spring of 1803.  While there, Poinsett stayed at the 
home of Jacques Necker and his daughter, Madame de Stael.  Necker, French Finance 
Minister from 1776 to 1781 under Louis XVI, had been driven into exile by Napoleon.  
On one occasion, Robert Livingston, the United States minister to France, was invited for 
a visit while he was touring Savoy, France, and Switzerland.  Poinsett was compelled to 
assume the role of interpreter between the deaf Livingston and the aged Necker whose 
lack of teeth made him almost indiscernible.  Fortunately, Madame de Stael tactfully 
assumed the duty of translation for her elderly father.5   
 Poinsett left Switzerland for Vienna, Austria, in October 1803, and from there 
journeyed to Munich.  In December, while still in Austria, he received word that his 
father was dead, and that his sister, Susan, was seriously ill.  He immediately left Austria, 
and secured passage back to Charleston through Rotterdam.  He arrived in Charleston 
early in 1804, months after his father had been laid to rest.  Hoping to save his sister’s 
life, Poinsett took her on a voyage to New York, remembering how his earlier voyage to 
Lisbon had intensified his recovery.  Yet, upon arriving in New York City, Susan 
                                                 
4 Rippy, Versatile American, 9. 
5 Stille, Life and Services, 10. 
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Poinsett died.6  As the sole remaining heir, Poinsett inherited a small fortune in town 
houses and lots, plantations, bank stock, and “English funds.”  The entire Poinsett estate 
was valued at more than a hundred-thousand dollars or more, a princely sum of wealth 
for that time.7 
 On July 25, 1804, less than a week after his sister’s death, Poinsett journeyed up 
the Hudson River and then to Niagara Falls, which greatly impressed the already widely 
traveled southerner.  He made his way back to the Atlantic coast via the Green Mountains 
in Vermont and arrived in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  After a short respite in Boston, 
Poinsett returned to Charleston in the fall of 1804 and remained there for the next two 
years.  During that time he refused to settle into a profession.  Having no one to keep him 
at home, he once again yearned to travel.  Poinsett left for Russia in the fall of 1806.8 
Russia in 1806 appeared to be on the verge of being invaded by Napoleon.  
French forces defeated the Prussians recently at Jena and were awaiting the following 
spring to renew the campaign.  Poinsett arrived in the Russian capital of St. Petersburg in 
November of 1806.  Levett Harris, consul of the United States at St. Petersburg, and the 
highest American official in the country, immediately sought to introduce Poinsett at 
court to Czar Alexander.  The next morning at Parade, he was warmly received by his 
Russian hosts and Poinsett recorded in his journal that he was never without 
entertainment.9   
 On one occasion, the Empress mother asked Poinsett if he would inspect the 
cotton factories under her patronage.  Poinsett and Consul Harris traveled by sleigh to 
                                                 
6 Rippy, Versatile American, 16. 
7 Ibid., 6. 
8 Herbert Everett Putnam, Joel Roberts Poinsett:  A Political Biography, (Washington D.C.:  Mimeoform 
Press, 1935), 7-9. 
9 Stille, Life and Services, 12. 
 16
nearby Cronstadt to see the factories.  Poinsett made some suggestions on improvement, 
which the Empress mother accepted.  Most interestingly, Poinsett did not believe the 
cotton industry could be successful in Russia because of the necessity of employing serfs 
who received no compensation and therefore could have no interest in its prosperity.  
Poinsett also believed that the institution of serfdom made it difficult for Russia to have a 
merchant marine or industrialize in the future.10    
 In January, 1807, Czar Alexander invited Poinsett to dine at the Palace.  
Afterwards, he and the Czar had a confidential discussion in which Alexander asked the 
American if he would enter the Russian civil or military service.  Czar Alexander had 
recruited many foreigners into his government.  Poinsett was hesitant in his reply, which 
prompted Alexander to advise him to “see the Empire, acquire the language, study the 
people,” and then decide.11  Seeing the opportunity to travel yet again, Poinsett followed 
the advice and left St. Petersburg in March 1807 on a journey through southern Russia.  
He was accompanied by his English friend Lord Royston and eight others.   
With letters recommending them to the special care of all Russian officials, 
Poinsett and Royston made their way to Moscow.  They were among the last westerners 
to see Moscow in its oriental splendor, as many of the Greek churches they visited were 
burned by Napoleon’s forces in October 1812.  From Moscow they traveled eastward, 
and then descended down the Volga River by boat arriving at Astrakhan, situated at the 
mouth of the river.  Poinsett and Royston were entering a region recently acquired by 
Russia through conquests by Czars Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.  Thus, the 
westerners were traveling into a region where Czar Alexander was not in full in control.  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 15-16. 
11 Rippy, Versatile American, 24. 
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This area, generally known as the Caucuses, was populated by Russians, Georgians, 
Armenians, and others who were in constant conflict which made travel very dangerous 
for outsiders.  They were to be provided with a Cossack escort as they traveled between 
Tarki and Derbent, but when a Tarter dignitary claimed that this would only provoke 
danger, the escort was bypassed for the security of the Tarter chiefs.  A larger party 
would also make Poinsett’s company less vulnerable to attack as it passed out of Russia 
proper.  Thus, they were joined by a Persian merchant, who was transporting young girls 
he acquired in Circassia to Baku and harems in Turkey.  With a strong Persian and Kopak 
guard, the party left Derbent and entered the realm of the Khan of Kuban. 
   While traveling through the Khanate, a tribal chief stole some of the horses in 
Poinsett’s party.  Poinsett boldly decided to go out of his way to the court of the Khan in 
the town of Kuban to demand their return.  As there were normally never any foreigners 
in this place, the Khan was greatly surprised.  Of course, he had never heard of the United 
States, and Poinsett did the best he could to answer all the questions the Khan had.  In 
order to convey the greatness of the U.S., Poinsett spoke at length on its geography.  The 
Khan referred to President Thomas Jefferson as the Shah of America.  Finally, Poinsett 
stated that the theft of his horses would reflect badly on the fair name of the Khanate.  
The Khan was impressed and told Poinsett that the head of the guilty chief was his for the 
asking.   Moreover, he stated that since the thief had made it possible for him to accept 
such a distinguished visitor, perhaps a pardon might be in order, and Poinsett agreed. 
 Poinsett and Royston were later entertained with large quantities of food and 
wine.  The festivities began at five in the afternoon, but it was after midnight before the 
guests finally retired to a piazza.  The next morning, as Poinsett’s party prepared to 
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depart, the Khan presented them with two fine horses and begged them to mention him 
and his court in the foreign lands they were yet to visit.12 
 Poinsett and Royston next stopped at Baku on the Caspian Sea.  He noted that 
because of the petroleum pits in the region, it had long been a spot of pilgrimage for fire-
worshipers.13  Attracted by the military movements in the Caucasus Mountains, Poinsett 
visited Erivan, which was then besieged by the Russian Army.  After a time with the 
troops, Poinsett and company journeyed through the mountains of Armenia to the Black 
Sea.  Having to avoid Constantinople because of the war between Russia and Turkey, 
they preceded to the Crimea, then through Ukraine, reaching Moscow late in 1807.  The 
trip had been hazardous and Poinsett’s health was much impaired. Furthermore, of the 
nine who had set out on the journey the previous March, Poinsett and two others were the 
only survivors.14 
 The political situation was quite different in St. Petersburg upon Poinsett’s return.  
After Russia’s defeat in Friedland in June, 1807, Czar Alexander signed the Peace of 
Tilsit, which made Russia an ally of France.  However, Czar Alexander’s original offer to 
Poinsett was still available.  Czar Alexander discussed the details of Poinsett’s trip with 
him and offered him a colonelcy in the Russian Army.  However, news had reached 
Russia of the attack of the H.M.S. Leopard upon the Chesapeake and war between the 
United States and Great Britain seemed certain.15  Poinsett eagerly sought to return to his 
homeland. 
                                                 
12 Rippy, Versatile American, 25-29. 
13 Putnam, A Political Biography, 14. 
14 Stille, Life and Services, 25. 
15 Putnam, A Political Biography, 15. 
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 Before leaving Russia, Poinsett met one last time with Czar Alexander, who 
expressed his approval of the energetic measures by the Congress of the United States to 
resist the maritime pretensions of Britain.  The Czar declared that Russia and the United 
States should maintain the same policy of respect. Poinsett again met with Foreign 
Minister Count Romanzoff where the Russian disclosed to Poinsett that the Czar ardently 
desired to have a minister from the United States at the Russian Court.16   
Poinsett arrived at the hot springs of Toeplitz, Bohemia in 1808 to hasten his 
recovery from his trip into southern Russia.17  Poinsett was eager to return home as was 
evidenced by a letter he wrote in March 1809 stating he believed that war with Britain 
was inevitable:    
I shall go immediately to Washington, in the hope of being employed.  I have 
picked up some military knowledge which may be useful to my country.  I have 
also a large collection of books, among them the best authors on military tactics.  
My wish is to commence my military career, in case of war, as aid-de-camp to 
some general…As aide I should be useful and in the way of promotion.  At all 
events, if war is declared, I shall serve, if I have to enter the ranks as a 
volunteer.18 
 
When Poinsett finally arrived in the United States in 1809, the international 
situation had become much more complicated, especially regarding Spain.  In 1808, 
Napoleon conquered Spain, and placed his brother Joseph on the throne.  Napoleon then 
sent out agents to Spain’s colonies to alert them to the new chain of command.  His 
agents were not welcome in many Spanish colonies, and some of them began to form 
revolutionary juntas to defend the rights of the Spanish monarch.  These juntas opened 
                                                 
16 Rippy, Versatile American, 30. 
17 Putnam, A Political Biography, 16. 
18 Rippy, Versatile American, 31. 
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the ports of their respective colonies to all nations.19  For the United States, which was 
already being harassed on the high seas by the British and the French, the prospect of 
France obtaining Spanish lands bordering the United States was disturbing.  The United 
States sought to take advantage of this new state of affairs.   
Consequently, President James Madison appointed several commercial agents to 
be sent to Spanish America in 1810.  He appointed Joel R. Poinsett as special agent to the 
southern portion of South America.  Poinsett’s appointment to this position was a 
conciliatory gesture.  Since his return from Europe, Poinsett had lobbied strongly for a 
position in the military.  President Madison and Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin 
had desired to appoint Poinsett Quartermaster General to the army; however, Secretary of 
War William Eustis opposed the appointment and Poinsett was denied this position.  
Reluctantly, he accepted the post in South America under the condition that President 
Madison recall him for military service in case of war.20 
Poinsett’s official orders came from Secretary of State Robert Smith, who 
instructed him to proceed immediately to Buenos Aires to ascertain the situation between 
Spain and her colonies.  As the severing of ties between Spain and its colonies was 
eminent, Poinsett’s mission was, “to take such steps, not incompatible with the neutral 
character and honest policy of the United States, as the occasion renders proper.”21  He 
was also to convey the great friendship of the U.S. towards these new South American 
countries, regardless of their systems of government or their European relations.  To 
enhance Poinsett’s prestige and safeguard the commerce of the United States in South 
America, Secretary Smith vested him with the status of “Agent for Seamen and 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 35-36. 
20 Putnam, A Political Biography, 22. 
21 Ibid., 24. 
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Commerce in the aforesaid port of Buenos Aires, and such other ports as shall be nearer 
to it than to any other agent in the United States.”  Poinsett was to discharge all the duties 
of a consul in so far as they concerned American citizens in the southern portion of South 
America.22   
Poinsett departed from New York on the ship Niagara on October 15, 1810.  He 
arrived in Buenos Aires on February 13, 1811, and was promptly presented to the Junta 
of Buenos Aires by Juan Larrea, one of its members.23  Poinsett believed Larrea and his 
colleagues, like other juntas in the region, feared and courted Great Britain. Great Britain 
was bound by international agreements with Spain and thus refused openly to recognize 
these movements for independence.  England hoped to hold the peace until the current 
international agreements no longer existed.   
 Poinsett believed that if these new revolutionary states could be brought to act 
decisively for independence before the relations between Spain and Britain terminated, 
American influence might replace the British.  In a letter dated February 16, 1811, 
Poinsett wrote to Secretary of State James Monroe for more open instructions with a 
letter of credence from the latter addressed to the governments of Buenos Aires, Chile, 
and Santa Fe de Bogota.  Poinsett also wanted further clarification as to the extent of his 
own authority.  Monroe declined to send further instructions and plainly refused any help, 
stating that “the destiny of these provinces must depend on themselves.”  Poinsett found 
it difficult to maintain this degree of neutrality.   
 In February 1811, Poinsett discovered that the British minister in Buenos Aires 
sought to obtain a commercial advantage for shipping.  Specifically, these proposed 
                                                 
22 Dorothy M. Parton, The Diplomatic Career of Joel Roberts Poinsett, (Washington D.C.:  The Catholic 
University of America, 1934), 3-4. 
23 Ibid., 6.  
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commercial regulations required the United States vessels to discharge cargo bound for 
Buenos Aires at the nearby port of Montevideo.  Poinsett sent a letter to the Junta 
protesting any such action.  As a consequence of his remonstrance, the proposed 
regulations were never adopted.24   
Hoping to maintain vigilance against British maritime pretensions in Buenos 
Aires, Poinsett suggested that William G. Miller be appointed as the resident consul at 
Buenos Aires or Lima.25  He reiterated that the interests of the United States could be 
best served by a permanent consulate at one of these cities.  Accordingly, Poinsett wrote
to Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin to use his influence to obtain this office fo
Miller.  Because of his knowledge of the Spanish language, business experience, and 
honorable character, Poinsett believed Miller would be best suited for the job.  The 
Madison administration ignored this request. 
 
r 
                                                
 Poinsett settled down in Buenos Aires in March 1811 determined to convince the 
governing Junta of the Rio de la Plata to adopt liberal and stable commercial regulations.  
Poinsett contended with a strong presence of British merchants who had a stake in 
maintaining the current duties.  Accordingly, Poinsett continued to urge the State 
Department to appoint a resident agent in Buenos Aires to block the British from 
acquiring exclusive commercial privileges.  The Madison administration finally granted 
Poinsett more power on April 30, 1811, appointing him consul general of the southern 
South American Republics and named Luis Goddefroy to work under him.26  In 
September 1811, Poinsett desired to have someone permanently stationed in Buenos 
 
24 Ibid., 15-17 
25 Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830, 
(Baltimore:  The John Hopkins Press, 1941), 68. 
26 Parton, The Diplomatic Career, 19. 
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Aires because he became aware that a revolution was brewing in Chile against the 
monarchists in control.  Now that a permanent position was established in Buenos Airies, 
he departed for Chile. 
In November 1811, Poinsett set out across the Andes for Chile.  On December 29, 
1811, he reached Santiago.  Previous to Poinsett’s arrival, the Larrains and Carreras 
families had been rivals for power in Chile.  When Poinsett arrived, the Carreras gained 
control under its leader, Jose Miguel Carrera.  Carrera’s government was split on how to 
receive Poinsett.  The tribunal del consulado, the organization with jurisdiction over 
commercial matters opposed his reception on the grounds that his nomination had not 
been confirmed by the U.S. Senate.  Moreover, many of the members of this group were 
royalists.  Nevertheless, Poinsett received recognition as a majority wanted to establish 
trade relations with the U.S.   
 The official reception finally occurred on February 24, 1812, and was a large 
event.  Poinsett was the first accredited agent of a foreign government to reach Chile, and 
Carrera, well aware of the significance, made the occasion as grand as possible.  In his 
speech, he assured Consul-General Poinsett of the sincere friendship of the Chilean 
people and of their desire for commercial relations with the United States.  In Spanish, 
Poinsett replied:  “The Americans of the North generally observe with the greatest of 
interest the success of these countries, and ardently wish for the prosperity and happiness 
of their brothers of the South.”27   
Poinsett’s main adversary in Chile was the junta of Peru.  The Colonial Viceroy 
of Peru resented the Chileans’ disregard for Spanish authority.  He declared the laws of 
the new Chilean government relative to free commerce null and void and sent privateers 
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to enforce the old colonial system.  Seizure of ships and confiscation of cargoes soon 
followed, to the dismay of foreign traders, especially Americans.28  Poinsett learned of 
the seizure of an American whaler searching for supplies from an intercepted letter from 
the governor of San Carlos de Chiloe to the viceroy of Lima.  Furthermore, he received 
intelligence that ten other American vessels were seized at Talcahuana in the Bay of 
Conception.29  With little guidance from the Madison administration, Poinsett decided 
that something had to be done to halt violations of American neutral rights. 
Poinsett was performing his duties in spite of a severe lack of communication 
with the Madison administration.  Because of this, he began to make decisions on his 
own, many of which went beyond his call of consul-in-general.  These actions were 
clearly out of line, and specifically went against his instructions from President Madison.  
However, Poinsett was headstrong and he did not receive sufficient oversight from the 
administration.   
Poinsett urged Chile to close its ports to Peru, but the authorities in Santiago did 
not feel they were strong enough to take such a step.  Instead they urged Poinsett to aid 
them in obtaining arms and supplies from the United States.  Although Poinsett furnished 
the names of certain dealers, many of them were already too involved with the conflict 
between the U.S. and Britain to give any attention to the Chileans.  He also urged the 
Chileans to create a national constitution.  A commission consisting of Camilo Henriquez 
and six others were named for the purpose of drawing up a constitution.  The first 
meeting of the group was held at Poinestt’s residence on July 11, 1812.30 
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  While these measures were positive, they did not stop the seizure of American 
ships by royalist Peru.  Poinsett concluded that something had to be done to stop these 
violations of American neutral rights.  His commission stated that he was to protect all 
American property and provide for American citizens.  After a consultation with Carrera, 
Poinsett accepted a commission into the Chilean army to fight against the Spanish 
Royalists based in Peru.  He finally found himself in a position to achieve the military 
glory he sought.  Poinsett was later given the rank of general in Carrera’s army.  He led a 
charge at the head of the Chilean cavalry in the Battle of San Carlos and secured a victory 
for Chile.  From there, he went with a battery of flying artillery to the Bay of Conception, 
where ten American vessels had been seized.  His small army arrived at dark near the 
seaport of Talcahuano and began firing on the town.  At dawn he sent an emissary to 
demand the surrender of the bay to the Junta of Chile.  The Peruvian royalists surrendered 
on May 29, 1813.   
The growing unrest between Great Britain and the United States and his desire to 
achieve some military glory for his own country were always foremost in Poinsett’s 
mind.  On August 18, 1812, he wrote to his cousin saying, “do not let them forget me at 
Washington, remember that my whole soul is wrapt [sic] up in the hope of fighting 
battles of my country before I die.”31   
 In early September 1813, the United States Frigate Essex arrived in Chilean 
waters and cleared them of English whalers and cruisers.  When Commodore David 
Porter of the U.S.S. Essex arrived in Santiago, Poinsett received the first authoritative 
news of the War of 1812.  He now desired more than ever to return to his home.  
However, this could not happen until Commodore Porter completed his cruise of the 
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Pacific.  Finally, as the Essex set out with Poinsett aboard, the Phoebe and Cherub, 
British warships were spotted in the port of Valparaiso.  Commodore Porter returned to 
Santiago to utilize the guns of the fort there.  He also hoped the neutrality of the bay 
would discourage any British attack.  Captain Hillyer attacked nonetheless, and 
Commodore Porter was defeated.  The British decided to send their American prisoners 
back to the U.S. in a cartel.32  Poinsett was forced to stay behind in Chile.   
 When Poinsett returned to Buenos Aires, he found a Junta that was very well 
established with a strong British influence.  Just before he left, he negotiated a 
commercial agreement with the Junta by which American articles of general consumption 
were admitted free of duty.  As American shipping had been driven from the South 
Atlantic, it took some time to find passage back to the United States.  Poinsett finally 
secured passage aboard a vessel going to the Bahia, a state in the northeastern part of 
Brazil.  From there he transferred to another ship bound for the Madeira Islands, located 
535 miles from mainland Europe.  Poinsett finally reached Charleston on May 28, 1815. 
The Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812 had been signed the previous December.  
The Battle of New Orleans catapulting General Andrew Jackson into eternity had also 
been over for many months.  Poinsett had missed his chance at military glory.33 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONGRESSMAN AND DIPLOMAT 
 Upon his return in 1815, Poinsett spent the first few months putting his personal 
affairs in order.  It was during this time that he received a letter from Secretary of State 
Monroe commenting on his final report as general-in-consul to South America.  The 
letter was very gracious, and Poinsett found the approval especially gratifying because of 
the neglect by the Madison administration to Poinsett’s mission.   In 1816 as he was 
beginning to settle down in Charleston, Poinsett received a letter from his old friend 
General Jose Miguel Carrera.
 Since Poinsett’s departure, the Chilean Royalists had consolidated their hold on 
Chile, and after spending a year in exile in the provinces of the Rio de la Plata 
(Argentina), Carrera came to the United States in January 1816 to stimulate interest for 
the revolution in Chile.  In response to Carrera’s letter, Poinsett wrote the general stating 
that he intended to urge the U.S. government to develop decisive policy regarding the 
Spanish colonies.  Moreover, Poinsett promised he would devote himself to the service of 
his old friend.34  President James Madison received General Carrera warmly, but never 
offered him any official encouragement because of the current instability of the 
international world and the ever watchful eye of Luis De Onis, the Spanish minister.35  
Looking to acquire Spanish Florida, Madison worried that seriously entertaining Carrera 
might jeopardize gaining that peninsula.  Carrera’s only hope of help came from his 
former comrade.   
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In July 1816, Poinsett traveled to New York to meet Carrera.  While there, 
Poinsett attempted to interest John Jacob Astor, the wealthy owner of the American Fur 
Company, in supplying Carrera’s Chilean revolutionists with weapons; however, Astor 
declined to get involved.  Poinsett’s initial failure aroused Carrera’s suspicion that the 
South Carolinian no longer cared about his cause.  This impasse was soon forgotten by 
Carrera when, in August 1816, Poinsett was able to arrange some conferences in 
Philadelphia between the Chilean leader and some of Napoleon’s former officers.  
Among them were Marshal Emanuel Grouchy, who had commanded Napoleon’s body 
guards during the Russian Campaign.  Poinsett also arranged a meeting between Carrera 
and General Bertrand Count Clauzel.  Clauzel had distinguished himself in the 
Napoleonic Wars and was given the distinction of Peer of France by Napoleon in 1815.  
Although Carrera’s movement never benefited from the experience of these French 
officers, Poinsett did succeed in obtaining contracts with the firm D’Arcy and Didier of 
Philadelphia to supply arms for the expedition which Carrera was planning.36 
 On August 29, 1816, Poinsett, along with four young men and one slave from 
Charleston, set out from Philadelphia on a tour of the West.  They made stops in 
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati, before stopping in Lexington, Kentucky.  While in Lexington, 
the group stayed with Congressman Henry Clay.  It is possible that in relating his 
experiences in Chile, Poinsett may have made quite an impression on Clay, who would 
distinguish himself as the biggest American supporter for Spanish American 
independence in the next few years.  From Lexington, the travelers made their way to 
Louisville, and then on to Nashville, Tennessee.  While in Nashville, Poinsett and his 
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companions had breakfast with Andrew Jackson.  Poinsett, after traversing more than two 
thousand miles, finally returned to Charleston in early November 1816.37 
 While Poinsett had been touring, President-elect James Monroe was 
contemplating sending a public mission to South America.38  Because of his past 
experience, Poinsett would be a logical candidate to lead such a coalition. While in 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Poinsett wrote to his friend Dr. Joseph Johnston on September 
2, 1816, regarding the rumors:  “I can assure you I feel very indifferent about it.  I had 
rather remain and make myself known.  I am aware that influence to be permanent and 
honorable must flow from the people, and I should prefer to derive it from them, not from 
the executive.”39  Perhaps some of the youthful restlessness in Poinsett had finally 
subsided.   
There was more to the decision than the ebbing of Poinsett’s characteristic 
restlessness.  He was aware that his friends had nominated him to represent Charleston, 
South Carolina in the state legislature.  In Greenville on his way back home, he learned 
that he had won the nomination and had a seat in the state house of representatives.40   As 
he was beginning his first term in April 1817, the rumored position of American envoy to 
South America became reality. On April 25, 1817, acting Secretary of State Robert Rush 
offered Poinsett the position of special commissioner to South America stating, “No one 
has better qualifications for this trust than yourself.” Rush also added that he would be 
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personally gratified by Poinsett’s acceptance.  Nevertheless, Poinsett declined the 
honor.41   
The reasoning behind Poinsett’s rejection of this offer is multifaceted.  First, there 
were the actual goals of the mission to consider.  Poinsett’s mission would be to cruise 
along the coast, communicating with the various governments of the continent.42  While 
such an expedition would be a triumph for a man who had left that same region secretly 
and traveled a roundabout route just two years before, Poinsett believed that such an open 
expedition had no real hope of discovering the actual conditions of South American 
countries.  Furthermore, even if he completed the mission there were no assurances that 
the Monroe administration would grant recognition to any South American nation. 
In May Poinsett explained to President Monroe that he had recently accepted a 
seat in the legislature of South Carolina and could not resign it “without some more 
important motive than this commission presents.”43  Poinsett perceived that the mission 
would not lead to any substantial decision for recognition and was unwilling to give up 
his seat in the House.  In the same letter, Poinsett offered his knowledge of South 
America to the service of whomever the Monroe administration appointed.  He then 
added:   
Should the result of the inquires determine the Government to acknowledge the 
independence of these colonies, and to afford them effectual assistance, I hope 
you will give me an opportunity of serving my country in the field, and will 
redeem the pledge given to me by Mr. Madison, and which was my chief 
inducement to accept the commission.44   
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This comment indicates that Poinsett’s declination of the commission cannot 
merely be explained by his being elected a state legislator or his lack of confidence in the 
outcome of the mission.  In the statement above, Poinsett was referring to the 
arrangement with former President Madison by which he accepted the position of 
general-in-consul to the southern South American states only after he had been denied the 
quartermaster general position.  Moreover, Poinsett had assurances from President 
Madison that in the event of war with England, he would be recalled to accept a position 
in the military.  He was never recalled, and his chance to obtain military glory passed him 
by.  The experience made Poinsett bitter, and now he was unwilling to do any more 
special work for the executive office.  When this bitterness is placed in context of what 
Poinsett stated about the origin of power, his reasoning for rejecting the post is clear.  In 
the letter of September 2, 1816, Poinsett states that he had come to the realization that 
permanent power can only come from the people, not the “executive.”  Poinsett had given 
up on receiving any real recognition or power through special missions to the president.   
While Poinsett’s diplomatic career was over for the moment, he still sought a 
position in the military, as his May 6, 1817, correspondence shows. This is evident in the 
November 4, 1818, report he submitted to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams on the 
current state of South America.  Poinsett’s report is uncharacteristically pessimistic as he 
argues against recognition.  He believed recognition would only provoke Spain’s wrath.  
Furthermore, Poinsett declared that in such a war the United States would be forced to 
spend money for arms and supplies for their South American allies as well as send 
military advisors to lead the armies.45  If Poinsett’s appeal on May 6 is placed in this 
context, it would seem that he was intimating he wanted a position in South America as 
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one of those American military advisors.  Whatever the reasons, Poinsett was a state 
representative now and was ready to approach his new occupation with vigor. 
In the letter to Dr. Joseph Johnston dated September 2, 1816, Poinsett stated that 
he wanted it understood that he was a Republican candidate, as opposed to a Federalist.  
Poinsett’s political values mirrored those of others at the time who considered themselves 
Jeffersonian Republicans.   One of the most important measures supported by 
Jeffersonian Republicans following the War of 1812 was that of federally funded internal 
improvements.  As a member of the state legislature, this was one of Poinsett’s passions.  
After being re-elected to the South Carolina House in 1818, he became a member of the 
Committee on Internal Improvements and Waterways.46  
As with other states, South Carolina was appropriating money for internal 
improvements.  In 1820, the South Carolina legislature established a Board of Public 
Works.  The Board was composed of five members, with Poinsett serving as president.  
One of the main plans of this board was to link the interior of the state with the seaboard.    
Another important project was the construction of a highway from Charleston through 
Columbia, to the northwestern border of South Carolina.  It was designed to promote 
interstate commerce as well as to draw commerce from eastern Tennessee and western 
North Carolina to Charleston.47  Poinsett, a seasoned traveler, knew better than anyone 
the importance of good roadways.  Through his journeys in New England in 1804 and 
especially to the west in 1816, Poinsett understood that his country could benefit from 
transportation facilities. 
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 In 1820, Poinsett won a seat in the United States House of Representatives for the 
Charleston district.  His term began on March 4, 1821.  One of Poinsett’s first speeches 
was directed against an 1822 bill which proposed to reduce the size of the army.  As a 
congressman, he advocated the maintenance of a strong army and navy.  In December 
1823, Poinsett submitted a resolution calling upon the Committee on Naval Affairs to 
inquire into the expediency of authorizing the construction of ten additional sloops of 
war.  As a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Poinsett took strong views on 
developments in South America.   
Poinsett’s political views were aligned with such nationalists as Secretary of State 
John Quincy Adams and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun.  Although they would later 
become political rivals over Nullification in 1823, the two men were in agreement on 
increasing the size of the military and federal funding of internal improvements.  They 
also both bitterly opposed the Tariff of 1824.    In February of that year Poinsett wrote 
Dr. Johnson in Philadelphia:   
I do not know in what light you view it, but I would sooner vote for a war with the 
Holy Alliance than vote for this bill.  I believe the operation of this law, if it 
becomes one, will be more injourous to the character of the people, the prosperity 
of the country and the durability of the Union, than a long expensive and bloody 
war.48  
  
                                                
Furthermore, on April 8, Congressman Poinsett denounced the bill as: 
  calculated to change the character of our institutions; to drive thousands of our 
fellow-citizens from the business and pursuits for which they were educated, and 
in which they have hitherto found wealth and happiness; to build up large fortunes 
among a favored class at the expense of the people and on the ruins of agricultural 
and commercial interests of the Union; to substitute the miserable population of 
manufacturing towns for our hardy race of husbandmen and sailors;…to plunge 
this country into all the corruption and immorality which are never failing 
consequences of a prohibitory system of duties; and by depriving Government of 
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the revenue now derived from duties on imports, to compel it to resort to internal 
taxation and excise…most odious to a free people.49   
  
According to Poinsett, the natural economic progression of the United States 
began with agriculture.  From agricultural prosperity, commerce is created.  Commerce 
creates capital, which can then be used to establish manufacturers.  Poinsett believed 
speeding up this process by creating a protective tariff would destroy it.50  While Poinsett 
and Calhoun equally detested the tariff of 1824, both would seek to handle the situation 
in different ways. 
While he was serving as congressman, Poinsett continued to be recognized for his 
knowledge of South America.  The Monroe administration requested that he bring his 
special talents in regard to Spanish America to bear once more.51  He was to make a 
semi-official visit to Mexico to report on the conditions there before the United States 
created a final policy toward the new leadership of that country.  Poinsett accepted the 
call graciously.  It seems by this time Poinsett was ready to travel again, and any anger he 
still harbored from his past experiences was gone.  He departed from Charleston on 
August 28, and after a stop in San Juan, arrived in Vera Cruz on October 19, 1822.  He 
was welcomed by the governor of that province, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.  From 
there Poinsett’s small party made its way to the city of Jalapa where he was received by 
another high official of the new government.  On the morning of October 27, 1822, 
Poinsett arrived in Mexico City.  During his two week stay, he had many interviews with 
Mexican officials, and met with Mexican Emperor Iturbide on November 3, 1822.  
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Poinsett’s impressions of Iturbide were especially important as the Monroe 
administration was going to make a decision on whether to recognize the new Mexican 
monarchy based on his report.52   
On November 10, Poinsett left the city and reached the port of Tampico on 
December 15.  The U.S.S. John Adams was not in Tampico as it was supposed to be, so 
he was forced to spend some unwanted time in the sickly lowlands.  Finally, he paid a 
pilot one-hundred and fifty dollars to take him out to sea on a “sixteen oared” boat in 
search of the corvette.  Having found it, he set sail for the United States, making only one 
stop in Havana, Cuba.53 
Once back in Washington, Poinsett wrote his official report to Monroe on the 
conditions in Mexico.  He told Monroe, “Iturbide cannot maintain himself many months 
on the throne because of his violent dissolution of Congress had so stirred the indignation 
of the people.”  If the United States recognized the Emperor, the latter would possess a 
distinct advantage over those who were unanimously in favor of a “constitutional form of 
government.”54  In other words, Poinsett cautioned that the United States should not 
recognize a monarch as it would discourage those who sought a republican form of 
government in Mexico.  Soon after Poinsett left Mexico, Iturbide was deposed by Santa 
Anna and Guadalupe Victoria.  Iturbide abdicated the throne on March 19, 1823.55  
Poinsett’s observations were correct, and the United States withheld recognition for the 
time being. 
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Victoria and Santa Anna established a republic in Mexico in 1823, with Victoria 
serving as the first president.  The United States was the first country to recognize this 
new republic.  The Monroe administration quickly sought to appoint a minister to Mexico 
to begin negotiations for commerce and boundaries.  In January 1824, Senator Edward 
Ninian Edwards of Illinois was appointed Minister to Mexico.  However, as he prepared 
to leave the country he was embroiled in a public controversy with Secretary of the 
Treasury William H. Crawford.  As he was going to be called to testify in Washington, he 
resigned the commission so someone else could be appointed.56  The position was first 
offered to Poinsett through fellow South Carolinian John C. Calhoun on July 8, 1824.  
Calhoun, who was currently the secretary of war, anticipated a close presidential election 
in 1824, and advised Poinsett to deliberate carefully before acceptance as his ballot might 
decide the vote of South Carolina should the election of the president be thrown to the 
House of Representatives.57  Poinsett, following Calhoun’s suggestion, initially rejected 
the post.   
President Monroe renewed the offer in January 1825.  By this time, South 
Carolina had decided for Jackson in the presidential election. Yet Poinsett remained 
reluctant and urged the appointment of Thomas H. Benton of Missouri instead.58  
Poinsett may have declined the offer because the Calhounites were hoping to make him 
secretary of state to the new Adams administration in an attempt to block the expected 
nomination of Henry Clay. The presidential election had gone to the House of 
Representatives, and Clay used his influence to give a majority of the electoral votes to 
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John Quincy Adams.  Many people expected that Clay might receive a nomination for 
services rendered.  Only after Clay had been nominated the secretary of state did Poinse
accept the diplomatic office.  It is also notable that before accepting the position, Poinsett
sought the advice of Andrew Jackson, who had just lost the presidential election, and wh







n Mexico.62   
                                                
Poinsett’s instructions as Minister to Mexico were sent to him on March 26, 1825 
by Secretary of State Henry Clay.60  Before he reached his destination, efforts were made 
to discredit him.  Mexican Minister to the United States Pablo Obregon wrote to his 
government that the envoy was “not a person of great talents.”61 Also, an imperial 
official who had been close to Emperor Iturbide named Azcarate, wrote to President 
Victoria that in 1822 Poinsett had confided in him a desire to acquire for the United 
States a large portion of norther
Besides hearsay and rumors, Poinsett’s job was complicated because the United 
States had not appointed a minister to Mexico quickly enough. While the United States 
was the first to recognize the Republic of Mexico, the British were the first to have an 
official emissary in that country.  Henry George Ward was the British Charge d’Affaires 
to Mexico, and had already taken advantage of the absence of an American 
representative.  On April 6, 1825, British agents in Mexico concluded a commercial 
treaty with Mexico.  While this treaty was rejected by British Foreign Secretary George 
Canning, it demonstrated that Poinsett had some catching up to do.  Furthermore, Poinsett 
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was naturally suspicious of the British influence.  He had witnessed such influence in 
Peru and Brazil, and he had contended with it in Chile and Argentina.  On March 30, 
1825, Poinsett’s friend C.C. Cambreleng advised him to “take care that John Bull” got 
“no advantage” of him.63  Poinsett of course needed no reminder.   
One of Minister Poinsett’s most important missions was to acquire a part, or all of 
Texas.  His instructions from Secretary of State Henry Clay included three deals:  First, 
the line of 1819 established a community of navigation on the Red River and the 
Arkansas River which could eventually lead to collisions and misunderstandings; the 
cession of Texas would leave the Mexican capital nearer the center of its territories; and 
such a cession would transfer the troublesome Comanche Indians to the United States.  
Poinsett entered boundary negotiations with the Mexican government shortly after 
arriving in Mexico City on May 25, 1825.  Over the next two years, Poinsett endeavored 
to reach an agreement based on the deals he was authorized to make.  He failed as the 
Mexican government was unwilling to give up any of its territories. 
 In March 1827, he was authorized once again by Secretary Clay to broach the 
subject.  He was to suggest two boundary lines.  A line at the Rio Grande was preferable, 
but one at the Rio Colorado was also acceptable.  He was also authorized to include the 
sum of a million dollars for the Rio Grande line, and twice that much for the one at the 
Colorado.  This new attempt at negotiations was hampered by British interference and a 
revolt by American settlers in Texas.  Ward had spent much time persuading the Mexican 
government that the Americans were untrustworthy.  When American settlers in eastern 
Texas revolted in what is known as the Fredonian Revolt, Ward’s admonitions seemed 
correct.  On January 12, 1828, Poinsett gave up and signed an agreement confirming the 
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boundary of 1819.  In a letter from Poinsett to Clay dated February 7, 1828, Poinsett 
lamented Ward’s influence:   
           “This government and people have been kept purposely in a continual state of 
excitement upon this very delicate question.  We have been represented by the 
agents of certain European powers as the natural enemies of Mexico; and our 
desire to make altercations in the treaty limits concluded with Spain, was 
constantly urged as proof of our bad faith and insatiable ambition.”64   
 
Poinsett did not take up boundary negotiations for the Adams administration 
again.  President Andrew Jackson’s administration sent new instructions to Poinsett in 
1829 advising him to offer a maximum of five million dollars for an area comprising 
most of Texas.  At this point though, Mexico had become politically unstable and 
Poinsett made no attempt to present this new plan in his remaining weeks as Minister to 
Mexico.65   
As Minister, Poinsett had also been negotiating with the Mexican government for 
a treaty of commerce and navigation.  Secretary Clay had authorized Poinsett to urge the 
Mexican government to recognize the principle of reciprocity with the United States.  
Once again, Ward was waiting in the wings to thwart his American counterpart.  Ward 
protested this concession because it had not been granted to his country in the treaty 
Great Britain had concluded with Mexico the previous April.  Poinsett was forced to 
forgo the principle of reciprocity for a proposal of most favored nation status.66   
Poinsett was not in Mexico City long before certain members of five newly 
founded York Rite Lodges requested him to obtain for them charters from the United 
States.  As Poinsett was a York Mason himself, he complied.  He also installed a grand 
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lodge of the York Rite in his own residence in Mexico.67  Many of the men in these 
organizations were men of influence in the Mexican government.  Members of the 
cabinet, congressmen, senators, and notable military figures such as General Vicente 
Guerrero and Santa Anna were York Rite Masons.  The movement was so successful that 
within a few months, eighty-two lodges had been created.  These new groups soon 
became the political opposition to the royalists in the Mexican government, who also 
happened to be Scottish Rite Masons.  At this point, Poinsett wisely began to desist from 
attending their meetings.  Yet, the damage was done as he was already associated with 
them and continued to rely on them for influence.   
By the middle of September 1826, the Yorkistas had become strong enough to 
alarm President Victoria.  To placate this new political power, Victoria reorganized his 
cabinet, placing Ramos Arispe and Sebastian Camacho, two prominent Yorkistas, in 
permanent positions.  President Victoria, associating Poinsett with this group even made 
it a point to reassure Poinsett of his friendship.  Victoria’s alarm was real, as the 
Yorkistas, as members of the York Rite Lodges were known as, won many of the 
elections in 1826.  Poinsett regarded this as a victory for the U.S. as he wrote Secretary of 
State Henry Clay that the new party would elect General Guerrero to the presidency in 
1828, who favored relations with United States over Great Britain.68 
Scottish Rite Masons, known as Escoseses, criticized Poinsett for his involvement 
with the Yorkistas directly following their defeat.  They claimed he was following a 
course in Mexico similar to the one he followed in Chile.  In June of 1827, the agitation 
expressed itself in petitions from the legislatures of Puebla and Vera Cruz demanding 
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Poinsett’s recall.69  Upon hearing of this, Poinsett called on President Victoria for an 
explanation.  Victoria refused to show him the memorials that had been addressed 
confidentially to the chief of the nation, but assured him of his “high consideration,” and 
offered to write President Adams a letter that would “leave no doubt” of the minister’s 
innocence.  Poinsett threatened to ask his government to recall him, to which Victoria 
unsurprisingly had no objection.70  A few days after this meeting, the Vera Cruz 
legislature made public the manifesto Poinsett desired to see.  It characterized Poinsett as 
a “sagacious and hypocritical foreign minister…zealous for the prosperity of his own 
country” and hostile to Mexico.71  It also stated its belief that all of Mexico’s misfortunes 
were attributed to the founding of the York lodges, which were declared to be far more 
dangerous than “twenty battalions” of the tyrant of Spain.72 
 The Escoseses’ outcry did not deter Poinsett.  He received word that General 
Guerrero had declared that he was going to join the movement, at the time becoming 
popular, for expelling from Mexico all remaining European Spaniards.  The leaders of the 
party hoped Poinsett could restrain Guerrero from endangering himself.  They wished to 
elect him president in the 1828 elections, and such an action would imperil Guerrero’s 
political future.  Poinsett wrote Guerrero alerting him of his friend’s wishes, and the 
general did not participate.73  
 The election of 1828 resulted in a narrow victory for Gomez Pedraza, and plunged 
the whole country into a state of violence.  Discontented with the outcome, Guerrero’s 
faction refused to concede defeat, and initiated a violent struggle for political superiority.  
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As Santa Anna led the fight on the Gulf Coast, Guerrero commanded forces in Mexico 
City.  Pedraza was forced to renounce his presidential claims.74  Guerrero was officially 
inaugurated on April 1, 1829.    
While Poinsett hailed Guerrero’s victory, the latter’s machinations in internal 
Mexican politics was at an end.  The Mexican legation in the United States Jose Montoya 
commented to Secretary of State Martin Van Buren that public opinion had announced 
itself against Poinsett.  The denouncement was not only from the opposition Montoya 
revealed, but had become a general outcry.  On July 1, 1829, President Guerrero wrote 
President Andrew Jackson requesting that the American envoy be withdrawn from his 
post.  Jackson reluctantly granted the request, but assured Poinsett of his firm confidence 
that his envoy had done nothing to merit the prejudices which had developed against him 
in Mexico.   
Poinsett’s meddling in Mexican affairs was widely known.  In a letter from 
Samuel Ingham to John C. Calhoun on August 28, 1829, Ingham explains that he had 
heard a rumor that Poinsett had been assassinated while in Mexico.  Ingham expressed 
his fear that Poinsett had mingled in Mexican affairs too much.75  On December 9, 
Poinsett received his letter of recall and left Mexico City on Christmas Day.  He arrived 
in Washington D.C. in late March 1830.76 
As U.S. minister to Mexico, Poinsett strived to help foster a constitutional form of 
government in that country, as he had done in Chile.  In both instances he failed.  As in 
Chile, Poinsett involved himself in situations that a diplomat had no business in.  With 
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his diplomatic career over, Poinsett returned to the United States to begin a new career as 






CHAPTER 3  
UNIONIST ORGANIZER 
In the early months of 1830, South Carolinian angst towards the recently passed 
Tariff of 1828 came to a boil.  The “Tariff of Abominations,” as it was known, raised 
import duties from thirty three and a half percent to fifty percent, causing continued 
deterioration of South Carolina’s economy.77  Within this atmosphere Joel Poinsett 
returned home from Mexico.  He found himself arrayed against many South Carolinian 
colleagues on the monumental issue of states’ rights. 
Many of Poinsett’s fellow Carolinians believed that applying the doctrine of 
nullification was a suitable way to alleviate the pressures which afflicted the state.  The 
South Carolina legislature created a special committee charged with the preparation of an 
exposition of wrongs and remedies on the tariff issue.  This committee then asked 
Calhoun to undertake the task.  The remedy Calhoun advocated was the doctrine of 
nullification.  Calhoun’s proposal, entitled the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, 
was circulated around the state in an anonymously authored pamphlet.  
As Poinsett traveled to the United States, a debate on nullification erupted in the 
Senate by a resolution calling for an inquiry into limiting the sale of public lands.  
Between January 19 and 27, the debate on this resolution turned into a referendum on 
nullification.  South Carolina Senator Robert Y. Hayne, who in 1827 spoke out against 
giving federal funds to the American Colonization Society, stated that he opposed 
payments for public lands partly because the funds would give the government a “fund 
for corruption, fatal to the sovereignty and independence of the states.”  Senator Daniel 
Webster of Massachusetts argued that federal appropriations were a source of 
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improvement, not “a fund of corruption.”78 Hayne defended the bill and labeled the 
Northeast as selfish and unprincipled for its support of protectionism and conservative 
land policies.  Webster widened the debate by examining the Southern positions on 
states’ rights in general and nullification in particular.79 
On April 13, 1830, as Poinsett was on his way to Washington D.C., another event 
occurred at the Thomas Jefferson Birthday dinner that evidenced a coming confrontation 
between South Carolina and the federal government.  Out of the twenty-four toasts 
proposed, all but six or seven mentioned Virginia and Jefferson and the great principles 
of states’ rights for which both stood.  Senator Robert Y. Hayne, chairman of the 
Committee on Arrangements, spoke long and eloquently about how “great and glorious” 
victories had been won under the standard of states’ rights.  He then proposed his toast:  
“The Union of the States, and the Sovereignty of the States.”  When Jackson was asked to 
present a toast he stood and said “Our Union:  It must be preserved.”  As those words 
ricocheted around the room, John C. Calhoun rose to give his toast.  “The Union, next to 
our Liberty, the most dear.”  It was clear that there was a divergence of opinion between 
Jackson and Calhoun.  Further evidence of Jackson’s feelings on disunion was summed 
up in a meeting he had with a South Carolinian congressman a few days after the dinner.  
On his way home, the congressman stopped by the White House to ask the president if 
there was anything he could convey to his friends back home.  “No, I believe not,” 
Jackson immediately replied.  He just as quickly changed his mind stating:  “Yes I have; 
please give my compliments to my friends in your State, and say to them, that if a single 
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drop of blood shall be shed there in opposition to the laws of the United States, I will 
hang the first man I can lay my hand on engaged in such treasonable conduct, upon the 
first tree I can reach.”80  Old Hickory, it appeared, would surely use military force in 
South Carolina to put down nullification if he had to.  
It was in this volatile atmosphere that Poinsett finally met with President Jackson 
for the first time since arriving in Washington D.C. in March.  In May of 1830, Poinsett 
told Jackson that he would proceed directly to South Carolina to oppose the “strange and 
pernicious” doctrines advocated by some of the “leading men of our state.”81  On 
February 11, 1829, while still in Mexico, Poinsett summed up his stance on the Union in 
a letter to his friend Dr. Johnson:  “To advocate a dissolution of the Union or any act of 
resistance to the execution of the laws of Congress…I can never be brought to consent, 
but most assuredly, I am not base enough to regard with indifference any act of the 
general government.”82 
By October 1830, Poinsett returned to his native state and proceeded to Columbia 
to ascertain the degree to which the “public mind” had absorbed the political ideas of 
Calhoun.  While consulting with old associates, he discovered that while small numbers 
objected to nullification, a formidable contingent were decidedly in favor of it.  He then 
went to Charleston where he found the situation was much the same.  Poinsett soon 
created a Unionist society to combat the Nullifiers.  Among the prominent members were 
William Drayton, a Senator of South Carolina; Hugh Legare, a prominent lawyer who 
had served in the state legislature and had become the editor of the Southern Review; 
James L. Petugru, a law graduate from Harvard, who had succeeded Hayne as state 
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attorney general; Christopher C. Memminger, who authored an anti-nullification volume 
and who later, ironically, became secretary of the treasury for the Confederate States of 
America; Richard Yeaton, who became the editor of the Courier and waged a vigorous 
campaign against the Nullifiers.83 
On October 28, 1830, Poinsett wrote Jackson detailing how the Nullifiers had 
used his name during the state elections.  At the same time, for reasons of secrecy, he sent 
another letter to Jackson through Robert Oliver, a friend in Baltimore, describing the 
conditions in South Carolina and declaring that a definite statement by the president 
would completely counteract the plans of the Nullifiers.84  The president’s response 
stated his opposition to nullification in no uncertain terms, and declared that his attitude 
should have been clear after the Jefferson Day toast.  “The South Carolinians as a whole 
are too patriotic to adopt such mad projects.”85  He advised Poinsett to use this letter with 
extreme caution, if he used it at all.86  To keep his party together, Jackson walked a fine 
line between denouncing nullification and supporting states’ rights. 
The October 1830 state elections were the first contest between the Nullifiers and 
Unionists.  The Unionists won a resounding victory, electing eleven of sixteen candidates 
to the state House of Representatives from the parishes of St. Philip and St. Michael.  
Even the Charleston Mercury, a Nullifier paper, admitted that the Union party did very 
well.87  This was a fortunate victory, for at this point, Poinsett’s health deteriorated.  As 
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sea voyages had been beneficial to his health previously, he left for England in the spring 
of 1831.88   
Back in South Carolina, the Charleston Nullifiers met on July 12, 1831 at 
Fayolle’s Hall, created a statewide States Rights’ and Free Trade Association, and called 
on other districts in the state to create local chapters.  The association hoped to unify the 
Nullifier’s campaign, distributing propaganda, and arrange meetings.  As the Nullifier’s 
crusade grew, the pressure on Calhoun to state his position increased.  Late in July, 
Calhoun issued a letter from his home at Fort Hill, announcing to the nation his belief in 
nullification.89 
Upon Poinsett’s return in November 1831, the position of the South Carolina 
Nullifiers had strengthened.  James Hamilton Jr., a leading advocate of Calhoun’s 
philosophy, won the governorship.90  On November 27, 1831, Poinsett attended a 
conference with fellow Unionists to determine support for presidential candidates in the 
coming elections.  Hostility prevailed, as Petigru presented a resolution calling for the re-
election of the president.  Jackson would be their candidate in 1832. 
It was in this context that Poinsett received a letter from fellow Unionist William 
Drayton, who urged his party colleague to join him in Washington to discuss further 
strategy.  While Drayton believed the protective tariff’s influence on the South Carolina 
economy to be inflated, he informed Poinsett that Martin Van Buren would lose southern 
support if the allies of the New Yorker did not support a compromise tariff.91  As Poinsett 
was preparing to leave, he was detained by a message from President Jackson which 
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expressed his intentions to order federal armaments at Poinsett’s disposal to the port of 
Charleston in anticipation of any outbreak of violence.92   
At the nation’s capitol in February 1832, Poinsett ascertained who was willing to 
create a compromise tariff to placate the Nullifiers of his state.  Poinsett spoke with 
Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams, both proponents of protectionism.  Writing to his 
friend Dr. Johnson, in early February, Poinsett related the important points of his 
meetings with these two statesmen.  In his meetings with Clay, Poinsett made it clear that 
all South Carolinians opposed the American System, however there was a divergence of 
opinion over the constitutionality of nullification.  Poinsett stated that while both Clay 
and Adams favored a protective system, “the former has delivered two thirds of a speech 
in which he advocates his ruinous and absurd American System.”  Because protectionism 
was central to the American System, Poinsett had very little faith in obtaining Clay’s 
assistance in any compromise tariff legislation.  Poinsett characterized Adams as a 
supporter of southern concessions, yet cautioned that the ex-president believed the South 
was unwilling to accept any conciliatory position.93 
Not surprisingly, Poinsett found both Clay and Adams obstinate in their stance on 
protectionism.  The most important aspect of Poinsett’s communications with the two, 
particularly with Clay, is in the way he described the difference between Nullifiers and 
Unionists.  He stated that while both the Unionists and the Nullifiers reject the American 
System, the Nullifiers were willing to take states’ rights to its ultimate conclusion, 
nullification and secession if necessary.  Poinsett understood that the contest in South 
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Carolina was between those advocates for states’ rights, who believed in a perpetual 
Union and decentralization of power, and those who believed that states’ rights meant a 
constitutional right to withdraw from the Union to protect the rights of the minority from 
the tyranny of the majority.  Poinsett’s grasp of this divergence of states’ rights ideology 
is integral to his relationship with President Andrew Jackson.   
Early in 1832, two events inspired the Nullifiers within South Carolina.  On 
March 3, 1832, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Worchester v. 
Georgia case.  Arguably, the philosophy of nullification was first demonstrated by 
President Jackson himself concerning Georgia’s refusal to adhere to the Court’s decision.  
The case revolved around Georgia’s jurisdiction in the Cherokee Nation.  Supreme Court 
Judge John Marshall declared a Georgia law that required all white men who lived in 
Cherokee territory to have a land-selling license unconstitutional, because the Cherokee 
Nation “is a distinct political community, and within its boundaries, the laws of Georgia 
can have no force.”94  Georgia ignored the court’s decision by not changing any of its 
policies on the matter.  President Jackson, an experienced Indian fighter, also ignored the 
court’s ruling and Georgia’s failure to adhere to it.  A widely believed rumor was that 
after the decision Jackson claimed, “Well:  John Marshall has made his decision:  now let 
him enforce it!”95  Nullifiers in South Carolina believed this event was a prime example 
of nullification in action and the supremacy of states’ rights over federal law. 
To South Carolinians, the crucial point was that Georgia had defied a federal law 
and Jackson had acquiesced.  “Georgia on a very recent occasion, nullified a decision of 
the Supreme Court,” wrote one leading upcountry editor.  “Do we see General Jackson 
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taking any coercive measures to enforce that decision? Is not the principle precisely the 
same with South Carolina? Is the tariff act more of a Supreme law than a Supreme Court 
decision?”96  Some Unionists also wondered if Jackson could be depended on for “the 
old man seems to be more than half a nullifier himself.”97  Jackson himself may ha
inadvertently contributed to the diminishing fear of federal coercion and the increasing 
chance of nullification’s triumph during the campaign of 1831-1832. Combined with the 
Nullifier’s belief that President Jackson supported them, these events contributed to their 
victories at the polls in the fall of 1832.   
ve 
                                                
The tariff of 1832 could not have come at a worse time for the Unionists in South 
Carolina.  On July 14, 1832, Congress enacted a new tariff aimed at assuaging the South 
Carolinians.  Without the support of President Jackson, this bill would not have become 
law.  The tariff slashed some items substantially and abolished the system of minimum 
valuation, yet it retained rates on cotton, woolens, and iron at almost fifty percent.  In 
effect it restored the tariff to what it had been in 1824 when the average rate on dutiable 
articles was about thirty-three percent.  While it reduced numerous duties, it left the 
protective principle unimpaired.98  Protectionism was the very thing the Nullifiers were 
rebelling against.  For Nullifiers, unless protectionism was repudiated, all hope of tariff 
reform was useless.  Accordingly, Nullifiers told the people of South Carolina it was 
hopeless to look to the federal government for justice.  Disgusted with the new tariff, 
Calhoun wrote to a friend in South Carolina:  “The question is no longer one of free 
trade, but of liberty and despotism.  The hope of the country now rests on our gallant 
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little state.  Let every Carolinian do his duty.”99  The Nullifiers of South Carolina were 
ready to deploy the doctrine of nullification.  
To combat the movement towards nullification, the Union Party convention 
assembled at Columbia in September 1832.  Colonel Thomas Taylor, a Revolutionary 
war veteran presided.  The convention appointed a committee of nine delegates to travel 
to the other Southern states to ascertain their views on the project of a general convention 
to secure revision of the tariff by Congress.  If other states could be convinced of the need 
of a convention, the delegates would be elected by legislative districts.  Poinsett and D.E. 
Huger were sent to Virginia and North Carolina.   
On October 8, 1832, the anticipated Congressional elections were held.  The 
Nullifiers swept the rural area of the tidewater, controlling thirteen of the seventeen 
parishes and winning seventy-six percent of the popular votes.  Governor Hamilton called 
for a meeting of the new legislature on October 20, ostensibly to use nullification to 
destroy the tariff of 1832.  While this victory seems overwhelming, the election was 
much closer than the numbers indicate.  The Nullifiers won less than a two-thirds popular 
majority, garnering approximately 17,000 votes.100  
At Seyle’s Hall in Charleston on October 15, 1832, Poinsett delivered an address 
intended to rally the Unionists.  Poinsett denounced those who sought to dissolve the 
union in order to protect their interests.  Moreover, he warned the opposition that those 
who would trample upon our rights, endanger the liberty of the nation, “violate that 
constitution which we venerate, and destroy the union”, would be confronted “at all 
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hazards.”101  The Unionist paper, the Charleston Courier, characterized Poinsett as a 
“man in a thunderstorm” standing erect an unmoved, while more “solid hearts were 
shivered to atoms by the forked lightnings.”102 
The day after his speech, Poinsett wrote Jackson informing him of the Nullifier’s 
victory at the polls as well as warning him that a state convention calling for an act of 
nullification would soon follow.  According to Poinsett, most Nullifiers believed that 
there was nothing congress or the president could do to stop them.  Poinsett lamented if 
this was so, there was nothing to do but to “witness the triumph of Mr. Calhoun.”  
Poinsett insisted that the Nullifiers intended to break open the customs houses if the 
collector refused to cooperate.  Promising to send a list of Nullifiers working in the 
custom house to Secretary of State Louis McLane, Poinsett warned that even the post 
office was suspect as he had been advised to not send a letter to the president through the 
office at Charleston.  Furthermore, Poinsett believed he and his fellow Unionists were 
going to have to defend themselves against “lawless violence, and we ought not to be left 
entirely defenceless [sic], I mean without arms and ammunition.”103  Poinsett was 
anxious at the prospect of violence, and the Unionists looked to him for precautionary 
measures.  Poinsett finally stated that he and the Unionists were depending on the 
“measures which will be adopted by the executive and an earnest desire to lend our aid to 
render them effectual.”104 
Poinsett’s report had quite an effect on Old Hickory.  On October 29, 1832, 
Jackson sent a confidential dispatch to Secretary of War Lewis Cass ordering him to issue 
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orders to the officers in charge of the forts in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina to 
beware any attempt to seize the forts, warning them:  “The attempt will be made to 
surprise the forts and garrisons by the militia, and must be guarded against with vestal 
vigilance and any attempt by force repelled with prompt and exemplary punishment.”105  
Poinsett’s dire disposition and personal appeal to the authority of the executive office had 
thoroughly convinced Jackson that the Nullifiers would resort to violence.  
Accordingly, on November 7, 1832, Jackson authorized George Breathitt, brother 
of the governor of Kentucky, to journey to Charleston, South Carolina, to ascertain the 
situation.106 Significantly, the first two of Breathitt’s directives were to investigate issues 
that Poinsett explicitly pointed out in his October 16 letter.  First, Breathitt was to 
determine whether there was a foundation for Poinsett’s allegations that the officers in 
the revenue service were aiding the views of the Nullifiers.  Breathitt was to collect 
evidence and specify the individuals involved.  Second, Breathitt was to investigate 
whether the “Post Master of the city of Charleston and his clerks or deputies are aiding 
the views of the same party.”  Jackson was acting on Poinsett’s admonition that the 
postmaster could not be trusted.  Breathitt was to find out if letters intended for the 
federal government were being examined before being mailed.  Third, if there were any 
other officers who held a commission with the federal government abetting the Nullifiers, 
Breathitt was to ascertain their names and the nature of their misconduct.  Lastly, in 
conjunction with Drayton and Poinsett, he was to “obtain all such information as may be 
useful to the Government to enable it to take timely steps towards the counteraction of 
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the effort of the Nullifiers to render inoperative the laws of the Union.”107  This last point 
was expounded on in a personal letter from Jackson to Breathitt that went along with his 
formal instructions.  Jackson wanted him to discover how far the civil jurisdiction of 
South Carolina extended over the bay and harbor of Charleston.  He was also to discover 
if South Carolina had established courts of admiralty before it ratified the federal 
constitution, or if it currently had courts of admiralty jurisdiction.  He also instructed 
Breathitt to check the defenses of the Sullivan Islands, and the armament at Castle 
Pinckney.108   
 A letter sent along with Breathitt to Poinsett further illuminated Breathitt’s 
mission.  Breathitt was posing as an agent of the post office bearing instructions from the 
secretary of the treasury to the collector of Charleston.  Under this guise, Poinsett was to 
show Breathitt the forts, revenue cutters, and the Sullivan’s Island.  Jackson made it clear 
that Breathitt was to discover if the Nullifiers really intended to resort to violence and 
what federal employees were sympathetic to their cause.109 
   By November 16, Breathitt had met Poinsett.  Instead of inspecting the forts, 
Breathitt went straight to Columbia, South Carolina.  Breathitt believed he could better 
determine the Nullifiers intentions by witnessing the convention that had been called.  
Poinsett assumed the job of examining the forts in Charleston harbor.  He hoped to send 
his report just as Breathitt was returning to Washington.  Subsequently, Poinsett 
reiterated his belief that the main goal of the Nullifiers was to “embarrass your 
administration and defeat your election; but they have led the people on so far under 
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other pretexts that they must proceed.”110  Further, Poinsett mused that after the collector 
of the customs house refused a writ of replevin from the Nullifiers, violence would ensue, 
“namely the breaking open of the public stores, which will rouse the indignation of the 
United States against them.”111  To prevent such an occurrence, Poinsett instructed that 
the customs house should be removed to one of the island forts. 
 Lastly, Poinsett insisted once more on having arms and ammunition sent to 
Charleston.  It was important for the Union party to be armed against “lawless 
violence.”112  Specifically, Poinsett requested hand grenades and small rockets which he 
believed to be excellent weapons in a street fight.  He also wanted United States rifles, 
claiming he could instruct his fellow Unionists in how to use them.113   
 Three days later, on November 19, the South Carolina legislature met.  On 
November 24, by a vote of 136 to 26, the convention passed an Ordinance of 
Nullification, which declared the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional, and null 
and void in South Carolina.  After February 1, 1833, the ordinance continued, “it shall 
not be lawful to enforce the payment of duties within the limits of this state.”114  If force 
were used, then the people of South Carolina “will thenceforth hold themselves absolved 
from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the 
people of the other states, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate 
government.”115  The state courts were prohibited from questioning the authority of the 
Ordinance or of subsequent acts to make it effective.  A test oath was to be prescribed by 
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the legislature which bound all officers of the state to obey, execute, and enforce the 
Ordinance and Acts.  In cases involving this oath which came to courts, the jurors were 
compelled to take it.  The legislature met as soon as the Convention adjourned.  Governor 
Hayne’s message recommended the raising of a State Guard of 12,000 and suggested a 
bill of pains and penalties for those who disobeyed the Ordinance and an “act of treason” 
for those who might resist the State in the defense of the Union.116  If the Federal 
government attempted to coerce South Carolina, she would secede from the Union.   
On November 29, 1832, Poinsett reiterated his allegiance and that of other 
Unionists stating, “We would rather die, than to submit to the tyranny of such an 
oligarchy as J.C. Calhoun, James Hamilton, Robt. [sic] Y. Hayne and McDuffie and we 
implore our sister states and the federal govt. to rescue us from these lawless and reckless 
men.”117  However, Poinsett believed that some of his fellow Unionists were intimidated 
by these lawless and reckless men.  He specifically mentioned the opinion of his friend 
Drayton, who believed that letting South Carolina leave the Union was the only option 
available to the United States Congress.  According to Poinsett, if one state left, the 
whole Union would dissolve, leaving the nation in an atmosphere in which domestic and 
foreign wars would ensue.  He appealed to Jackson’s vanity claiming that “if these bad 
men are put down by the strong arm, the union will be cemented by their conduct and by 
the vigour [sic] of the government, and you will earn the imperishable glory of having 
preserved this great confederacy from destruction.”118  
Responding to Poinsett’s description, Jackson reiterated that if “a posse comitatus 
prove not strong enough to carry into effect the laws of the Union, you have a right to call 
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upon the Government for aid and the Executive will yield as far as he has been vested 
with the power by the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof.”119  There is 
further evidence to support the idea that Jackson was seeking a moral authority.  Jackson 
informed Poinsett that they must proceed with a “firmness such as becomes those who 
are conscious of being right and are assured of the support of public opinion, we must 
perform our duties without suspecting that there are those around us desiring to tempt us 
into the wrong.”120  Furthermore, fearing an outbreak of violence before the message 
from Secretary of War Cass arrived, Jackson permitted Poinsett to show this letter to the 
commanding officer to receive whatever he needed to defend the Unionists.  
Foreshadowing Jackson’s forthcoming response to South Carolina’s Ordinance, he states:  
“Nullification therefore means insurrection and war; and other states have a right to put it 
down.” 121 
 Throughout the fall of 1832, Joel R. Poinsett was President Jackson’s closest 
informant in South Carolina.  Poinsett first proposed many of the precautions that 
Jackson took to prevent hostilities.  Without Poinsett’s analysis of the situation, Jackson’s 
decisions early on in the Nullification Crisis may not have been the right ones.  Poinsett’s 
correspondence also illustrate that he was sure conflict would come, and this assurance 
would continue to be a theme in they early months of 1833. 
 





DEFEATING THE “MONSTER” 
On December 10, 1832, Jackson issued what became known as the Nullification 
Proclamation.   The document repudiated nullification and secession while endorsing a 
nationalist view of the Constitution.  Jackson asserted:   
“I consider then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed 
by one state, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted 
expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, 
inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive 
of the great object for which it was formed.”122   
 
His proclamation was paradoxical in that it posited nationalism vis-à-vis 
nullification, yet advocated states’ rights against the American system.123  If Nullifiers in 
South Carolina were dismayed by Jackson’s decree, they were shocked by the time they 
finished reading it.  Towards the end, the president declared that disunion by armed force 
is treason, and warned that the first magistrate could not avoid the performance of his 
duty.  Lastly, he made a personal appeal to South Carolinians by asking them to “snatch 
from the archives of your state the disorganizing edict.”124  Although his words were 
harsh, Jackson hoped his native state would renounce nullification, thus precluding the 
need to use force.  The Nullifiers believed Jackson’s proclamation was the work of the 
South Carolina Unionists.  Some of their newspapers even accused Poinsett of being its 
author. 125 
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Regardless of authorship, the Nullifiers were not intimidated by Jackson’s decree.  
Their resolve was strengthened.  The Charleston Mercury denounced the “sophistry of 
the Royal Proclamation” as a “monarchical usurpation” of the executive authority.126  
The South Carolina legislature immediately responded by adopting a resolution declaring 
Jackson’s Nullification Proclamation unconstitutional, and Governor Robert Hayne 
issued his own counter-proclamation.127  On December 26, Hayne issued a proclamation 
which sought to build up the state militia; by the beginning of 1833, the governor and his 
district commanders were raising, equipping, and training an army to deter federal 
intervention.  Soldiers constantly drilled in the streets and, for a short time, Carolina 
uniforms and blue cockades were standard fare in churches and at tea parties.  Over 
25,000 men, more than had voted for nullification in the first place, volunteered to defend 
South Carolina against Jackson’s armies.  The army was more enthusiastic than efficient.  
It suffered from an obvious lack of officers, discipline, and arms.  The governor’s agents 
searched the North for weapons, and Hayne even established a cannon ball factory in 
South Carolina; the Nullifiers bought over $100,000 worth of arms in less than three 
months.  In their zeal, the Nullifiers eventually exhausted state funds before purchasing 
half of what they needed.  Furthermore, Hayne’s lieutenants reported that they would 
have to use guerrilla tactics in the woods if federal troops marched into South 
Carolin
                                                
a.128 
The same day Jackson issued his proclamation, a Union Convention convened in 
Columbia, South Carolina.  Poinsett became commander-in-chief of the Union Party for 
the entire state, with Robert Cunningham in charge of the western part and D.E. Huger 
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head of the Charleston section.  During the meeting, Poinsett took the floor several tim
arguing that the Nullifiers were actuated in part by resentment against Jackson as he 
failed to appoint a South Carolinian to his cabinet.  This point underscores Jackson’s o
belief that the Nullifier cause was one of disappointed ambition.  Poinsett assured the 
convention that President Jackson approved their plans for military organization, and that 
the arsenal in Augusta, Georgia, would be opened for the upper part of the state if they 
needed arms.  He then read a letter from Jackson in which the president pledged himself 
to put down nullification with all the power he possessed.
es 
wn 
bers cried “What 
have w
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g army.  





                                                
129  Many mem
e to fear? We are right and God and Old Hickory are with us.”130 
Poinsett and Memminger authored a report and protest, which denounced the 
Ordinance of 1832, and condemned the test oath as proscribing nearly half the free
South Carolina and making it impossible for thousands of them to hold office.  A 
complaint was also made against the proposal of the Nullifiers to raise a standin
The Unionist convention declared that this could be done only by a “system of 
conscription” which would “force the citizens of the state from their fire
 to take up arms and incur the pains and penalties of treason.”131 
Poinsett’s army was numerous enough to cause the Nullifiers some concern.  
While Poinsett worked hard to recruit and equip Unionist volunteers, his efforts
frustrated by previous Unionist weaknesses:  the petty jealousies of Charleston 
moderates, the expectation that the people would soon awaken from their delusion, an
the reluctance to fight against a Carolinian crusade.  Poinsett used the Committee
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Correspondence which the December Unionist convention established to create 
Washington Societies in many districts.  This program was particularly helpful to 
Unionist organization in the yeoman farming areas near the North Carolina border.  
Almost 8,000 unionists volunteered.  The total compromised less than one-half of the 
Unionist voters and less than one-third of the Nullifiers’ army.  Ironically, Nullifiers were
short on wea
 











doing so might split the delicate balance of the Democratic Party and confirm the belief 
                                                
ers. 
In Charleston, the Union men made their military preparations with utmost care. 
A code of signals was arranged with the federal army and navy officers.  The Unionists
were to first seize the Alarm Gun and the church bells, and then take possession o
Guard House.  If they were unable to hold the city, they were to withd
la of Hempstead to the northeast and entrench themselves.132 
  On December 17, Congressman William Drayton, acting on the advice of fellow 
Unionist Daniel Huger, begged Jackson to “not interfere with our party by affording them 
the aid of federal troops under existing circumstances.”133  Jackson, now reluctant to s
federal troops without Congressional approval, was happy to comply.  The president 
could keep the federal troops at the island forts and could use a civilian marshal’s pos
composed of South Carolina Unionists to enforce the laws.  On December 23, 1832, 
Jackson wrote Van Buren:  “The Union will be preserved and Treators [sic] punished, by
a due execution of the laws, by the Posse comitatus.134  However much he believed it
be in his authority as executive to do so, Jackson could not act unilaterally; he knew 
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that he was a tyrant.  President Jackson depended on Poinsett for advice on the 
developing situation in South Carolina. 
By the middle of December, five companies of federal artillery, numbering some 
280 men reached Charleston with heavy guns and ammunition.  Nevertheless, Poinsett 
wanted a more formidable display of federal authority.  Otherwise, he insisted, all hope 
of “putting down nullification by moral force” would have to be abandoned.135  The 
small Unionist force at Charleston faced more than five thousand volunteer militia o
Nullifiers as well as the Nullifier controlled artillery of Charleston.
f the 
                                                
136   Poinsett became 
increasingly impatient.  On January 8, 1833, he wrote Drayton:  “I go for practical results 
rather than metaphysical abstract rights.”137  While Poinsett supported Jackson’s 
Nullification Proclamation, he believed that only a strong federal presence would prevent 
hostilities.  Fueling this belief was Poinsett’s firm conviction that if one state were 
allowed to secede, the federal union would be at an end.   
While waiting for the South Carolinians to come to their senses, President 
Jackson took preventative steps to avoid a confrontation.  On January 16, 1833, he sent 
Congress a message describing conditions within South Carolina and requesting certain 
powers to diffuse the precarious situation.  In what became known as the Force Bill 
message, Jackson requested power to close the custom houses at Beaufort and 
Georgetown.  He claimed they could not be adequately protected from South Carolina’s 
replevin(explain replevin process) process in Charleston.  Thus, the United States should 
relocate them to “floating custom houses” on United States ships placed off each port.138   
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The Charleston custom house would be moved to the federally controlled fortresses at 
Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie in the harbor.  To stop the Nullifiers from procuring a 
tariff bond, Jackson asked for power to collect all duties in cash.  He also requested jails 
to be established if the Nullifiers refused to house Carolinians imprisoned for violating 
federal laws.139  These measures made it impossible for the Nullifiers to implement their 
ordinance and laws. Adroitly, they recognized that it made it easier for Jackson to place 
blame on South Carolina for any conflict that might occur.  If civil war were to occur, the 
Nullifiers would have to fire the first shot.  Many of the steps Jackson called for, Poinsett 
first advocated. 
  On the very day Jackson sent his Force Bill message to Congress he wrote 
Poinsett:  “You can rely on every aid that I can give, only advise me of the action of the 
Nullifiers.  The moment they are in hostile array in opposition to the execution of the 
laws, let it be certified to me by the atty [attorney] for the district, or the judge, and I will 
forthwith order the leaders prosecuted and arrested, if the marshal is resisted by 12,000 
bayonets I will have his posse 24,000…”140  Lastly, Jackson advised Poinsett to write 
him often, and to provide him with early warning of any armed force committing treason, 
and the individuals in charge.  “We will strike at the head and demolish the monst
nullification and secession at the threshold by the power of the law.”
er, 
                                                
141 
On January 16, Poinsett transmitted a letter to Jackson along with a copy of a 
circular letter addressed by Governor Hamilton to the officers of his staff, instructing 
them to make conditional contracts and other preparations for the transportation of troops 
from the interior to Charleston.  Poinsett claimed that while no troops had been moved in 
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accordance with this order, “the governor’s aids are already actively engaged in making 
the necessary arrangements in conformity with the instructions contained in this 
circular.”142  Poinsett’s fear of an invasion of Charleston now fueled a flurry of letters 
between him and President Jackson as to how to respond. 
Poinsett’s January 16 correspondence also informed Jackson that the Unionists 
were unwilling to form a posse merely upon the authority of a federal marshal because 
they feared if taken prisoner, they would be subject to prosecution under the laws of the 
state.  Rather than acting independently, they wanted Jackson to call out the state militia 
so they would be acting directly upon a presidential order.143   Poinsett informed Jackson 
that even if the Posse were called out by the U.S. Marshall, there was a “disinclination on 
the part of the majority of the Union Party in Charleston to join in mortal conflict with 
their adversaries as a part of the Posse.”144  Poinsett was hesitant because it was “certain 
in such a contest that father would be arrayed against son and brother against brother.”145  
Many Unionists also feared that if they acted unilaterally as the posse comitatus and lost, 
they would be at the mercy of the Nullifiers.  Although Poinsett wanted South Carolina 
Unionists to put down the Nullifiers without federal aid, without a strong majority, he 
could not “expose a few brave men to the certainty of defeat.”146      
Poinsett was also aware that some Unionists, particularly Congressman William 
Drayton, did not want the president to intervene militarily.  Poinsett wrote the South 
Carolinian congressman on January 16.  He stated that he knew Drayton requested on 
December 17, 1832, that President Jackson not interfere with the Unionist party by 
                                                 






supplementing them with Federal troops under existing circumstances.  Poinsett asked 
Drayton what the Unionists would do if Nullifiers decided to take Charleston.  He 
reminded Drayton of the Unionist party’s dire position, stating: “The artillery is in the 
hands of our opponents, and even if we had the ordnance we have no artillery men.  Five 
thousand men have volunteered, and those from Richland and Sumter are anxious to be 
brought down to insult us.”147  Poinsett concluded by asking Drayton if he thought 
“embodying and marching men to oppose the laws of the United States was an overt act 
of treason.”  Poinsett reiterated that such a situation required the intervention of the 
president.  Lastly, he lamented that he saw no way in which the revenue laws could be 
“enforced by legal processes.”148  
Since late adolescence, Poinsett had sought military fame.  The Nullification 
Crisis would be as close as he would come to fulfilling that dream.  As leader of the 
Unionist party in South Carolina, he did not want to lose to the Nullifiers, but he also 
wanted to be the one responsible for suppressing nullification.  His life long dream of 
military glory is one of the reasons why he advocated military action so strongly.  That 
Poinsett desired a conflict is indicative in a mid-January statement he wrote to the 
president:  “There are it is true some rash and violent men, who desire to bring on a 
contest with us or with the general government.  I almost wish they could be gratified.”149  
Although not rash or violent, Poinsett seemed to welcome a military contest. 
Poinsett kept up his frequent correspondence with President Jackson.  On January 
19, 1833, Poinsett declared to Jackson that nothing would prevent conflict “but the 
certainty on the part of the Nullifiers that we are prepared to meet them.  And I will soon 
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be able to give them that assurance.”150  Poinsett also revealed a fear of outside 
intervention.  He cautioned Jackson that an order for arms from the arsenal in Augusta, 
Georgia “would be important for the protection of our party upon and near the Georgia 
frontier.”  Poinsett lamented that revolutionists in Georgia and North Carolina had 
offered their services to the Nullifiers.151  
The next day Poinsett penned another letter to Jackson describing the conditions 
and his resolution to defend the state.  Poinsett warned Jackson that Governor Hamilton 
was making preparations to move troops from the South Carolina interior to Charleston.  
Poinsett feared that if the Nullifiers were allowed to occupy Charleston “we shall be 
exposed to their insults, which I much doubt if with all the Christian forbearance we can 
exercise, we can long brook.”152  Poinsett believed that if the Nullifiers could create a 
confrontation with the federal government, sympathetic parties in neighboring states 
would come to the aid of the Nullifiers.  While Poinsett stated he would “raise the 
standard instantly” before allowing South Carolina to secede from the Union, he 
reiterated that it could not be done without the “countenance of the federal 
government.”153  Poinsett also asked Jackson to place U.S. General Winfield Scott in 
command of any military maneuvers.154 
Despite Poinsett’s rhetoric, Jackson pinned his hopes on Poinsett and the 
Unionists.  Responding to Poinsett’s fear that the Nullifiers were getting ready to march 
on Charleston, the president wrote Poinsett to not fear any assemblage of force in 
Charleston.  Jackson reassured Poinsett declaring:  “I can if need be, which god [sic] 
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forbid, march two hundred thousand men in forty days to quell any and every 
insurrection, or rebellion that might arise to threaten our glorious confederacy, a union, 
upon which our liberty and prosperity and happiness rests.”155 
Jackson also consoled Poinsett’s fears of the involvement of other states in South 
Carolina’s quest for nullification.  He advised Poinsett to not be concerned with the 
Nullifiers receiving aid from other states.  While Jackson admitted that the Nullifiers had 
been encouraged by some from Georgia and Virginia specifically, he remained confident 
that the nation would support him.  Jackson boasted that even if the governor of Virginia 
attempted to prevent his armies from marching through that state to put down 
insurrection in South Carolina, he would arrest him and hand him over to the civil 
authorities. 
Jackson was hesitant to comply with Poinsett’s desire to have federal troops in the 
state because his own Democratic party and the National Republicans had made it clear 
that he should not act without the support of the U.S. Congress.  Jackson hoped Congress 
would give its approval to his Force Bill quickly, and with a large majority.  Even if the 
bill did pass by a large majority, for Jackson to acquiesce to the Unionists apprehensions, 
he would have to go against Congress, his own party, and the Nullifiers.156  He urged 
Poinsett to continue to provide him with early intelligence of any armed force attempting 
to “nullify and resist the revenue laws of the United States”, so that he could “relieve the 
good citizens of that despotism and tyranny.”157  He repeated that his “pride and desire,” 
was for the Union men themselves to “save my native state from that disgrace the 
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Nullifiers have brought upon her.”158  Despite Poinsett’s admonitions, President Jackson 
still hoped that a posse comitatus could withstand any violent uprising. 
Even though Jackson believed Governor Hayne’s creation of a Nullifier army was 
treasonous enough to warrant action, he recognized that some kind of overt act was 
necessary on the part of the nullifiers before they could be accused of subversive 
activities.  On January 26, 1833, Jackson ordered Secretary of War Lewis Cass to instruct 
General Winfield Scott, commanding federal troops in Charleston Harbor, that “it is the 
most earnest wish of the president that the present unhappy difficulties in South Carolina 
should be terminated without any forcible collision”; or if this were not possible that 
there should be no question that “if such collision does occur it shall not be justly 
imputable to the United States.”159 
Poinsett continued to press Jackson for action.  He wrote Jackson on January 30 
stating:  “So much anxiety is expressed by the members of the Union party on the subject 
of the advance of the States Rights forces from the interior, that you must pardon me for 
troubling you so often on the subject.”160  Poinsett essentially asked Jackson to encamp a 
thousand regulars at the U.S. Arsenal.  In his opinion, this would halt any Nullifier 
advance on Charleston.  Furthermore, Poinsett saw no “constitutional objection to the 
measure.”161 
While Poinsett worried for the sake of the Unionists in Charleston, he received 
encouraging news from upstate.  On February 5, Unionist organizer Simpson Bobo wrote 
Poinsett from Spartanburg describing that town’s Unionist movement.  He informed 
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Poinsett that a Union Society comprised of fifteen hundred men, capable of bearing arms, 
was created.  He claimed that his people were prepared to defend their rights, but they 
needed arms and ammunition.  Bobo informed Poinsett that the efforts of the Nullifiers to 
gain volunteers had been slow.  With only 150 to 200 members, Bobo assumed that the 
Nullifiers believed there would be no violence.  Yet, like Poinsett, he remained 
apprehensive for his fellow Unionists in Charleston.162   
On February 9, Poinsett wrote Jackson that he believed that even if the leaders of 
the Nullifiers called a halt to the movement, that they had “raised a storm beyond their 
control.”163  Poinsett believed the leading Nullifiers could not control the movement.  
Furthermore, Poinsett remained concerned that the Nullifiers might receive help from 
outside and even foreign forces.  Rumors were circulating that the British Consul, Henry 
Ogilby, had assured Nullifiers the Commander of H.B.M. Squadron in the West Indies 
would send warships to the harbor of Charleston in order to protect the persons and 
property of H.B.M.’s subjects.  Poinsett believed such an occurrence would embolden the 
Nullifiers, as “their leaders have all along led them to believe, that in a contest with the 
federal government they would receive the aid of Great Britain.”164 
Before Poinsett’s warning of Ogilby’s leanings, Secretary of State Edward 
Livingston met with British charge d’affaires Charles Bankhead on the conduct of the 
British Consul in Charleston.  As a result of this meeting, Bankhead wrote Ogilby that his 
exequatur would be revoked “on his first act of intemperance.”165  Jackson informed 
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Poinsett of this meeting and advised him to give the earliest possible notification that the 
British squadron had been ordered to Charleston.166 
On February 22, Poinsett’s perspective took a drastic change.  For the first time, 
Poinsett did not ask Jackson for some forceful measure.  His own words sum up his new 
position:  “The party with which I have the honor to act would prefer encountering any 
risk, rather than see the executive take measures for their protection, which are not 
warranted by constitution and laws of the United States.  I do not wish even to see 
measures adopted, which might be calculated to irritate or provoke a conflict.”167  It 
seems the impetus for this change of heart was the amount of enlistment in Unionist 
ranks.  According to Poinsett, there were 7000 enrolled in his army, not counting the 
forces concentrated in Charleston.  He estimated that he had a force of a thousand within 
Charleston.168 
  As Poinsett continued to build Unionist forces for any impending violence, there 
were other forces at work attempting to end the crisis peacefully.  Senator Henry Clay of 
Kentucky, whom Poinsett believed would not budge on tariff reform, was putting 
together a compromise bill.  Hoping to keep Jackson from claiming any credit for 
diffusing the situation, he quickly presented his compromise tariff on February 12, 1833.  
His compromise guaranteed that no duty was to exceed twenty percent after a duration of 
a decade.169  Aware of this measure, Poinsett wrote Jackson on February 28, explaining 
that he believed it would be better for the country at the moment if a tariff bill did not 
pass.  While he did believe the tariff needed to be modified, to do so at that point would 
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have the appearance of yielding to the threats of the Nullifiers.  Moreover, Poinsett was 
convinced that the Nullifiers were “determined to go on in their mad career.”170  While 
many Nullifiers were, their leader was ready for compromise. 
Anxious to end the standoff, Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, as well 
as other moderate Nullifiers were willing to listen to Clay’s proposal.  It should also be 
noted that due to the perceived betrayal by Jackson, Nullifiers, like Calhoun, did not want 
the president to have any credit in the peaceful ending of the controversy.  Clay the 
protectionist, and Calhoun the Nullifier had little regard for Jackson and enough in 
common to work together for the sake of compromise.  
President Jackson also had a compromise bill being considered in Congress to end 
the crisis.  However, due to Poinsett’s admonitions on tariff reform, Jackson did not labor 
as hard for its passage as he did for the Force Bill.  Vice President-Elect Martin Van 
Buren had developed a compromise tariff with Senator Gulian Verplanck of New York.  
The bill actually conceded everything the South Carolina Nullifiers were demanding.  For 
their respective reasons, Clay and Calhoun could not allow this bill to pass.  Through his 
contacts in the House of Representatives, Clay had the Verplanck bill substituted with his 
own compromise tariff.  While Clay and Calhoun’s opinions differed substantially, it is 
important to remember that Jackson was their shared political nemesis.  Moreover, the 
Verplanck bill was unacceptable to Calhoun in part because it was a Jackson/Van Buren 
measure and because Calhoun was willing to provide some relief to manufactures, as 
long as the principle of protection was removed in the new tariff bill.171  Jackson was so 
preoccupied with the passage of the Force Bill that he overlooked Clay’s skillful 
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machinations.  Ultimately he did not devote the attention the equally important Verplanck 
Bill required.   
Clay’s bill, known as the Compromise Tariff of 1833, passed both houses of 
Congress on March 1, 1833.  The new tariff put many protected goods on the free list and 
provided that rates on protected products would be lowered in gradual stages to the 20 
percent level by mid 1842.172  Nullifiers perceived the tariff as a victory due to their 
threats; however, they did not in principle, renounce nullification.   Moreover, many 
northern states disagreed with the tariff because they believed it was not high enough.  As 
a final act of defiance, South Carolina nullified the Force Bill on March 18, 1833.  
President Andrew Jackson decided to ignore this last act of defiance. 
A major confrontation between South Carolina and the federal government was 
avoided due to Poinsett’s connection with Jackson which kept the latter informed of the 
actual state of affairs in South Carolina.  Many of the decisions Jackson made were based 
on information he received from the South Carolina Unionist.  Perhaps a toast in his 
honor at the annual banquet of Charleston’s Emerald Isle Society summed it up best:  “To 
the honorable Joel R. Poinsett, his exertions in the holy cause of Union and Liberty, has 
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CHAPTER 5  
SECRETARY OF WAR POINSETT 
 The Nullification Crisis was over, but because leading Nullifiers in South 
Carolina portrayed the Compromise Tariff of 1833 as a victory, they remained in control 
of the state government.  The Nullifier’s Fourth of July toasts of 1833 proclaimed victory 
and assailed the Unionist opposition.  The Nullifiers volunteer militia remained in 
existence, and in April, it held a military festival in Charleston. 
 On March 21, Poinsett explained to President Jackson his strategy for the 
Unionists.  He stated it was important to remain quiet because he believed that there was 
so much discord among the Nullifiers that they would break into pieces as soon as the 
opposition was removed.  Moreover, he believed the largest threat facing the Union now 
were the factions in every state which supported Calhoun’s states’ rights views.  Poinsett 
proposed creating a national party to preserve the Union in any state “where the Monster 
Disunion may show his head, whether in the form of Nullification or in any other hideous 
shape.”174  He admitted that some of his colleagues dismissed the idea because the leader 
of such an organization would be in a position to take unfair advantage of such a 
situation.  Poinsett dismissed this accusation.  The national party idea never gained any 
traction, but Jackson did concur with Poinsett that the Unionists should lay low for the 
next few months.175 
Following the Nullification Crisis, Poinsett held no position within the South 
Carolinian government, yet he continued to be regarded as the leader of the Unionist 
movement. On March 24, 1834, he organized a Unionist Convention to create a platform 
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for the coming years.  The convention’s main objectives were to create a central 
committee for the party and select candidates for the fall elections.  The Georgetown 
district offered him the nomination of congressman.  He declined because he did not 
believe he could serve his new surroundings adequately as he recently moved there from 
Charleston.  Overall, the Unionists were defeated in the state elections of 1834, and the 
Nullifiers retained the state legislature.176   
With Nullifiers retaining control of the state government, the legislature held the 
majority needed to pass a law requiring state officials to swear allegiance to the state. 
Poinsett and the Central Committee sent James Petigru and Colonel Abram Blanding as 
delegates to Columbia to reach a compromise.  In this they were successful.  The oath 
was written into the South Carolina constitution, yet the Joint Committee on Federal 
Relations explained that the allegiance required by the amendment was merely “that 
which every citizen owes to the state consistently with the constitution of the United 
States.”177  Poinsett advised Unionist militia officers to take the new oath.178 
Poinsett avoided the spotlight by again declining the nomination for Congress 
from the Georgetown District in August 1836.  At fifty-five years of age, he now enjoyed 
working behind the scenes.  Besides age and bad health, he declined because he believed 
his presence divided South Carolina at a time when the state needed unity.  Moreover, 
Poinsett finally married on October 24, 1834, to Mary Pringle Izard, the widow of a 
former associate, Judge Julius Pringle.179  Even as Poinsett tried to settle down, the 
Unionist party continued to push him for public office. He eventually agreed to be elected 
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to represent Charleston in the state senate.  He served only one session before being 
nominated for an even greater position.180     
Aspiring to military glory all his life, Poinsett was a military liaison for President 
Jackson during the Nullification Crisis.  In 1837, President Martin Van Buren appointed 
the South Carolinian as secretary of war in his administration.   Poinsett received this 
position due to his services during the Nullification Crisis, yet it was also because of his 
friendship with President Jackson.  Even though he had sought reprieve from politics 
after 1833, this was an opportunity Poinsett had waited for all of his life.  His relationship 
with President Van Buren was good, as the latter allowed Poinsett a free hand in the War 
Department.181  Secretary of War Poinsett would leave a deep mark on that department. 
Perhaps the largest task facing the new secretary of war was the removal of the 
eastern tribes beyond the Mississippi River.  The Indian Removal Act of 1830 finally 
became reality under Poinsett’s tenure.  In 1838 his first major task was the removal of 
the Cherokee from Georgia.  In October of 1835, a delegation of Cherokee signed the 
Treaty of New Echota ceding all their lands east of the Mississippi to the U.S. for 4.5 
million dollars.  They also agreed to migrate two years from the date of ratification.182  In 
1838, Poinsett received word that a Cherokee tribal council voided the treaty and refused 
to relocate.183  In May 1837, he sent General Winfield Scott and a contingent of federal 
troops to round up the Cherokee and escort them to “emigration camps” where they were 
forcibly enrolled for removal.184  Poinsett directed Scott to protect the interests of the 
Cherokee as much as possible and to begin the process of migration as soon as possible to 
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avoid disease.  Having worked with Scott during the Nullification crisis, Poinsett knew 
how to deal with the man’s ego.  “I submit these suggestions as such, and not 
instructions.  You will in this, and in all matters relating to the Cherokees consult your 
own judgment, on which the Department places every reliance.”185  By December 1839, 
the emigration camps were emptied and the Trial of Tears began.    
Poinsett’s experience with the Seminoles of northern Florida was quite different 
from the Cherokees, and the subsequent war took much more of his time.  On the day that 
Poinsett’s nomination was confirmed by the senate in March 1837, General Thomas S. 
Jesup signed a preliminary armistice with Micanopy, the principal chief of the Seminoles, 
by which the latter agreed to migrate to the west in accordance with the terms of the 
former treaty.  Micanopy’s followers were gathered at Tampa by early June for removal 
to Indian Territory.  Upon arrival, white slave owners attempted to seize the tribe’s 
“African-American” allies, causing the Seminoles under the direction of Chief Osceola, 
to flee.186  General Jesup was embarrassed and offered to resign.  Poinsett did not accept 
his resignation, as he believed Jesup’s prior experiences would be essential to the success 
of the coming campaign.187  On December 2, 1837, Poinsett lamented that an inferior 
force of Indians had completely avoided every attempt of the federal army to subdue their 
hostility.  He also complained that there were too many volunteers in the army without 
the adequate training to carry out a successful campaign.188  During the following years, 
Micanopy and Osceola were both captured at the negotiation table.189  The war continued 
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in their absence, and Poinsett could do nothing to end it.  In his last report as secretary of 
war, Poinsett conceded that every effort “to terminate the contest in Florida” had 
failed.190      
Overall, Poinsett’s role as an enforcer of Indian removal was successful.  The 
annual report of the Indian Commissioner for 1838 announced the removal of 29,453 
Indians for the year.  It estimated that there were 22,000 remaining on the east side of the 
Mississippi which should be removed.  Removal was continued throughout the Van 
Buren administration.  Poinsett’s final official statement on the matter asserted that 
40,000 Indians in all had been settled upon their new lands with no disturbance.191  
As Indian tribes from the east were moved to the west among other indigenous 
tribes, it was believed the region would need greater security for white immigrants 
moving through to the west coast.  In January 1838, Poinsett urged Congress to adopt a 
comprehensive plan for the security of the western frontier.  He advocated the 
construction of six or seven forts within the Indian Territory to keep the peace among the 
tribes and function as a haven for those recently arrived Indians.  Poinsett wanted a 
secondary line of posts built in the west to be connected by a military road to facilitate 
the movement of troops and supplies in case of incursion.192  Along with forts and roads, 
Poinsett also advocated the organization of a volunteer force in each frontier state.  
Volunteers could be mustered into service according to their specific state laws for a set 
amount of time.  During their service, they would receive military instruction for a certain 
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amount of days in each year by regular officers of the United States army.  Congress 
rejected the militia phase, but eventually accepted some parts of Poinsett’s plan.193  
As a consequence of Indian removal and the costly Seminole War, Poinsett 
recognized the need for drastic changes were needed in the American military.  
Specifically, the heavy expenses of the Seminole campaign demonstrated the necessity of 
increasing and organizing the army staff, as well as creating an overall expansion of the 
military.  First, the infantry was to be increased by three regiments. One of those 
companies then needed to be added to each regiment of artillery.  Furthermore, he called 
for an enlargement of the Quartermaster’s department, an assistant to the adjutant general 
for each division of the army, and an increase in the number of topographical engineers.  
Lastly, Poinsett streamlined communication by re-organizing the whole army staff under 
a single corps of officers to bring about better cooperation between the divisions and 
promote a more uniform military policy.  On July 5, 1838, Congress passed an act 
incorporating Poinsett’s recommendations on the size of the army and its staff.  The 
general staff was increased from 111 to 162.  The engineering corps was doubled, and the 
ranks of the topographical engineers tripled.194  Poinsett’s suggestions of organization 
and enlargement helped modernize the military. 
Poinsett began the process of improving equipment and techniques.  In 1839, 
Poinsett obtained permission from the French government to send three cadets, W. 
Eustis, Philip Kearney, and H.S. Turner to study at the cavalry school of Saumur for a 
year.  Kearney afterwards went to Algeria to witness French military operations there.  
From these experiences, he went on to distinguish himself in the Mexican War and as a 
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commander of a cavalry division in the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War. 
Poinsett also revamped the role of light artillery in the American military.  He appointed 
Captain Samuel Ringgold to form the first field battery.  Ringgold selected suitable 
officers, and Poinsett insured that every man was separately mounted.  Though costly, it 
was a wise decision, as Ringgold’s battery of light artillery, as well as similar units, 
distinguished itself in the Mexican War.   
 The highlight of Poinsett’s modernization efforts was his elaborate plan for the 
organization of citizen soldiers.  With the exemption of certain individuals due to their 
official positions, all free, able bodied white male citizens between the ages of twenty-
one and forty were to be enrolled.  From this category, 100,000 were to be taken the first 
year, and 25,000 each succeeding year.  Each recruit would serve for four years in the 
active militia, after which he would be in a reserve force for another four years.  When 
these eight years had passed, no further duty would be required, except in times of crisis.  
If Poinsett’s proposals were put into effect, there would be an active force of 100,000, a 
reserve force of 100,000, with another 25,000 going into the active force annually.  The 
territory of the United States was to be divided into ten militia districts, and each state 
was allowed to appoint officers in its district.  The expense of training these recruits 
would be absorbed by the entire nation, and the president would have the power to call on 
this active force in times of domestic disorder or foreign invasion.195  Congress rejected 
these recommendations.  Americans were just not ready for a peace time military.   
Just as American inefficiencies during the Seminole War fueled Poinsett’s 
retooling of the American military, so too did the specter of a third Anglo-American war.  
During Poinsett’s tenure as secretary of war, the United States almost went to war twice 
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with the British.  The first crisis was due to the Canadian rebellions of 1837-1838.  
William Lyon Mackenzie and other Canadians rebelled against their British overlords.  
Invoking the revolutionary ideals of 1776, many Americans in New York relished the 
idea of incorporating Canada into the United States.  While President Van Buren 
proclaimed American neutrality in the conflict in November 1837, many Americans 
enlisted in Mackenzie’s forces.  A privately owned American steamer, the Caroline, was 
chartered to transport the American volunteers and supplies from Buffalo, New York to 
Navy Island in the Niagara River, the staging area for the volunteers.  On December 29, a 
Canadian officer loyal to the British and fifty militiamen boarded the Caroline and 
captured it.  One man was killed in the scuffle, and the vessel was set ablaze.  Americans 
were outraged, yet the British termed the action as self defense.196  Poinsett called on 
General Winfield Scott once again.  Despite the fact that Scott was a Whig who could 
potentially bring glory to Poinsett’s political opponents, the latter was not going to allow 
political considerations to be a factor. 
On January 5, 1838, a few days after the Caroline incident, Poinsett ordered Scott 
to New York to assume formal military command along the border.  Scott carried with 
him letters to the governors of New York and Vermont requesting they call out the 
militia; However Scott was to impress upon the governors the necessity of selecting 
troops from portions of their state that were distant from the border.  There was no 
authority to employ military force in restraining American citizens from crossing the 
border, so Poinsett hoped Scott could use his influence to prevent such an occurrence.197  
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Lastly, he assured the general of his full support and added:  “These hints are thrown out 
to you to be acted on as you see fit.  Every confidence is felt…in your prudence as well 
as your courage, and with the aid of the Governor [of New York] to whom I pray to be 
remembered, you will be able no doubt to concert measures and to restore tranquility on 
the northern frontier.”  As in the Cherokee Removal, Poinsett handled Scott’s delicate 
ego very well. 
 Richard Rush, the American minister to Britain, informed Secretary Poinsett that 
warships were being sent to the St. Lawrence River.  In response, Poinsett sent the latest 
recruits to reinforce the eighth regiment, which was employed in manning the forts on the 
northeastern frontier. 
 Henry Fox, British Minister to the U.S., though wary of Secretary of State John 
Forsyth’s assurances of neutrality, approved of Poinsett’s efforts to discourage hostilities 
in the northeastern area for the preservation of peaceful relations between England and 
the United States.  Furthermore, Fox informed British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston 
of Poinsett’s stalwart position in opposing the clandestine raids conducted by American 
citizens.198 
In early 1839, a boundary dispute erupted between Maine and the Canadian 
province of New Brunswick.  The New Brunswick provincial government extended 
jurisdiction over an area on the border that was in dispute.  As Canadian lumberjacks 
moved into modern upper Maine, that state’s legislature authorized the governor to 
dispatch militiamen to repel the invaders.  A small skirmish in the area led to the 
imprisonment of fifty Americans.  Tensions escalated as New Brunswick sent troops to 
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the area, and the U.S. Congress allotted $10 million and empowered the president to call 
out 50,000 volunteers.199 
Richard Rush, who had negotiated the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 which 
prevented the fortification of the American-Canadian frontier, was so alarmed that he 
became the leading advocate of preparedness in case of a third Anglo-American war.  In 
frequent correspondence with Secretary of War Poinsett, Rush emphasized the dangers of 
being involved in a third Anglo-American conflict.200  Preparing for a conflict, Poinsett 
advocated increasing the size of the regular army and instituting his citizen soldier plan.   
Poinsett again sent Scott to handle this border dispute on the Maine boundary.  
Scott was to quell the populace if possible and restrain the state legislature, which was 
being urged to assert its sovereignty as a state.  If the British refused to evacuate the 
disputed territory, Scott could call upon the army to assist the Maine and Massachusetts 
militias in removal.  As Scott prepared to leave for Washington, he solemnly told 
President Van Buren and Poinsett that if they wanted war, “I need only look on in 
silence”; if they wanted peace, he could assure them of nothing.201  At this time, Poinsett 
took the opportunity to allay British fears by informing Fox that Scott was “punctilious, 
not improperly so, in all matters” concerning the honor of the United States.202  Fox later 
wrote to Palmerston that he had observed “more honesty and singleness of purpose in Mr. 
Poinsett than in any other of the American ministers.”203  Perhaps more than any other 
official in the Van Buren administration, Poinsett helped lay the foundation for the 
Anglo-American rapprochement of the 1840s. 
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After the defeat of Van Buren in the 1840 presidential election, Poinsett retired 
from public life completely.  For the remainder of Poinsett’s life, the greatest issue 
confronting the United States was the annexation of territory from Mexico, along with the 
eventual spread of slavery to these territories.  When Texas gained its independence in 
1836, Poinsett, unlike his colleagues, desired the immediate annexation of Texas.  
Poinsett was so adamant that B.F. Hunt, the Texan minister to the U.S., wrote to his 
secretary of state on August 10, 1837 that “in Mr. Poinsett we have a powerful 
advocate.”204  While Poinsett as well as President Van Buren himself favored Texas’s 
annexation, Poinsett did not strongly advocate this position, and the administration as a 
whole avoided the issue.  
Poinsett’s nationalism as well as his experience in Mexico continued to make him 
a respectable source of advice.  In 1842, James Hamilton, Jr., a former South Carolinian, 
now a politician of the Republic of Texas, wrote to Poinsett.  Hamilton wanted Poinsett’s 
opinion on the forces necessary to lead a Texan conquest of Mexico.  Poinsett urged 
Hamilton to abandon the idea because he believed Texas did not have sufficient 
resources.  Poinsett advised Hamilton that the young Republic’s best course of action 
would be to strengthen its defenses and alliances abroad, specifically with the United 
States. 
Unfortunately, conflict was destined to erupt between the United States and 
Mexico over Texas.  On April 25, 1846, Mexican soldiers attacked a contingent of 
General Zachary Taylor’s troops north of the Rio Grande, killing eleven and taking the 
rest prisoner.  On May 11, 1846, President James Polk asked congress for a declaration of 
war.  As a former minister to Mexico, Poinsett was very familiar with the country and 
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believed that Mexico could not be easily conquered without capitalizing on the differing 
factions within the Mexican government.  Moreover, Poinsett was highly critical of 
Polk’s brinksmanship diplomacy.  His use of brute force alone to subdue a nation that 
possessed a multiplicity of natural defenses and a population of millions was a rash 
attempt to arouse support for his 54 40 or fight platform.  Furthermore, Poinsett 
maintained “that in Washington D.C. there exists an extraordinary degree of ignorance 
and presumption” over Mexico’s military capabilities.205  Despite Poinsett’s anxiety over 
Polk’s strategy and the safety of American troops in the war, the war was generally a 
success ironically due to Poinsett’s improvements as secretary of war.  Captain Benjamin 
Huger of the Ordinance Department wrote Poinsett a letter confiding that if not for the 
artillery companies that were created under Poinsett’s tenure, “we would not have gained 
the victories we have.”206 
As a result of the Mexican War over, the United States once again increased in 
size.  Yet, at the close of this war, a new war began over the extension of slavery in the 
territories.  Many in the South called for slavery’s expansion, while voices in the North 
called for the new territories to be free.  Poinsett’s opinion was now called upon to 
support those intending to extend slavery and protect the South’s doctrine of states’ 
rights.   
In June 1850, the South called together a convention in Nashville, Tennessee, to 
exert influence on congress in the region’s interests.  Richard Yeaton, the editor of the 
Charleston Courier and a Unionist during the Nullification Crisis, asked Poinsett his 
views on the matter in the hope of sending him as a delegate.  Knowing that Poinsett was 
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still ardently Unionist, Yeadon explained that the purpose of the convention was the 
preservation of the Union, but that “the just rights and constitutional equality of the 
Southern States” must be maintained.207  Poinsett promptly responded that he believed 
the convention was a mistake in the current state of affairs.  However, he claimed he 
would attend provided the convention’s goal was the defense of southern interests within 
the Union.208  Poinsett was still a nationalist, and could not proclaim the rights of the 
states over the federal government. 
In 1850, Poinsett wrote in the Charleston Mercury explaining why South Carolina 
should accept the Compromise of 1850.  He explained that the admission of California as 
a free state was not an error of an unjust federal government, but the result of the majority 
of opinion of its citizens.  Poinsett believed in Senator Stephan Douglas’s popular 
sovereignty, as he stated California had the right to determine the slave issue itself.  The 
provision providing for the payment of ten million dollars to Texas for cession of part of 
that state to New Mexico was also just as it avoided a war between those two states.  
Poinsett broadened the scope of his letter claiming that secession existed under the 
Articles of Confederation but not under the Constitution of 1787.  Secession and a 
confederacy of southern states would not bring peace, but chaos to the entire continent, 
similar to the “miserable aspect of the Spanish American states.”209  Furthermore, 
Poinsett claimed such a confederacy had no protection against the abolitionists of the 
North, or the hostility of Europe.  Lastly, Poinsett exclaimed that it would be as absurd 
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for South Carolina to secede from the Union by itself as it would be “for one to throw 
himself from the precipice in the expectation of injuring his enemy in the fall.”210 
Joel Poinsett died on December 12, 1851.  To his death, he continued to argue for 
a perpetual Union and against a southern confederacy.  His entire life was devoted to 
protecting and spreading American principles.  As a Jacksonian and a stout nationalist, 
his beliefs were as paradoxical as Andrew Jackson’s.  Poinsett was perhaps the last 





Poinsett’s most remarkable attribute and what makes him stand out among his 
contemporaries is his conception of the Union.  Poinsett clings to the Jeffersonian view of 
states rights’.  He despised most federal intervention unless it was for the military or 
internal improvements, and he saw slavery as an evil that would slowly die out.  Even 
before Jackson’s Nullification Proclamation, Poinsett understood as early as February 
1832, that there was a divergence of states rights’ thinking taking place in South 
Carolina.  Richard Ellis explained the constitutional debate surrounding nullification best 
in the preface to Union at Risk:  The crisis “was between those advocates of states’ rights 
who believed in perpetual Union and decentralization of power as the best way to fulfill 
the democratic promise of the American Revolution and keep government responsible to 
the wishes of the people, and those who advocated that a state had a constitutional right 
to withdraw from the Union and believed the doctrine of states’ rights provided the best 
way to protect the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the majority.”211  Poinsett 
recognized this divergence before there was even a crisis.  His astute observance of the 
situation at such an early point in the crisis is what makes him great. 
 Late in his life Poinsett stated that he believed John C. Calhoun would be 
remembered poorly by historians.  Upon the death of Calhoun, Poinsett remarked, “He 
will no more be remembered than Daniel O’Connell among the Irish, except for the evil 
he had inflicted upon this state.”212  Calhoun, of course, has been remembered for much 
more than Poinsett believed.  The author of nullification and the man most responsible 
for a states’ rights ideology that protects minority rights, specifically that of slave 
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holders, is the subject of numerous biographies and works.  Ironically, while Poinsett 
worked to preserve Union, he remains historically obscure, and is mostly remembered for 
the flower named after him, the poinsettia. 
Joel R. Poinsett deserves a modern biography worthy of his adventurous life.  His 
role as Unionist organizer, his idea of the constitution, and his nationalism are all aspects 
of his life that deserve greater scrutiny.  Certainly he did more for the cause of the Union 
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